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Japan and the European Union in the global economy
Japan and the European Union are open economies with significant trade and
financial links. Both are affected by the rise of emerging markets, which repre-
sent a huge opportunity but also imply the need to continuously adapt the pro-
duction structure to the new competition. Both economies also face compara-
ble internal economic adjustments. Japan, where it took years to resolve the
problems that arose in the banking sector in the 1990s, is pursuing the so-
called ‘Abenomics’ strategy to overcome deflation, re-invigorate economic
growth and increase productivity growth rates. Europe, meanwhile, continues
to struggle with the effects of severe crisis, with similar balance-sheet adjust-
ments happening in some parts of its economy. In Europe as in Japan, the role
of monetary policy and banking policy is hotly debated, and the appropriate
role of fiscal policy and structural reform is controversial in both economies.
This volume sets out to address these issues, and to identify some of the chan-
nels through which Europe can learn from Japan, and vice verse. It is the final
output of a strategic European Union-Japan research partnership, involving
Kobe University and Bruegel with selected outside contributors from Japanese
and European government and policy institutions.
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations. Bruegel’s
aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in Europe through
open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and discussion.
The Kobe University Graduate School of Economics was founded in 1953 and is
now one of Japan's leading educational institutes in the field of economics and
commerce. It offers doctoral and master's programmes, and cooperates with a
wide range of other institutions.
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Japan and the EU in the global
economy: challenges and
opportunities
GUnTRAm B. WOlff And mASAHIkO YOSHII
Ths book s the ﬁnal output of a strategc EuropeanUnon-Japan research partnershp,
whchwe ntated n order to deepen our understandng of twomajor economes facng
smlar challenges and opportuntes. Ths publcaton brngs together scholars from
Kobe Unversty and Bruegel alongwth selected outsde contrbutors from Japan and
the EU from government and leadng polcy nsttutons. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the support of Mlena Mathe and Olga Tschekassn for content revson
and coordnaton between contrbutors.
Why s Japan a good case study to help Europe overcome the economc and ﬁnancal
crss that started more than ﬁve years ago? What can Japan learn from Europe‘s
experence? Japan and the EU are both open economes wth sgnﬁcant trade and
ﬁnancal lnks; both face n many respects smlar challenges. Both economes are
aﬀected by the rse of emergng market economes, whch represent a huge
opportunty but also mply the need to contnuously adapt the producton structure
to the new competton. Both economes also face comparable nternal economc
adjustments.
Lookng at the hstorcal experence of Japan s helpful to drawsome lessons for Europe
today. Japan snce the 1990s had to overcome the burstng of a housng bubble and
to struggle wth sgnﬁcant corporate balance-sheet adjustment. The sgnﬁcant
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problems n Japan’s bankng systemwere not resolved formanyyears, mparng credt
to new busness endeavours and undermnng growth. The bankng system became
unable to fulﬁl ts ﬁnancal ntermedary functon and was later labelled a ‘zombe’
bankng system. Eventually Japan entered deﬂaton. The combnaton of deﬂaton and
the so-called zombe banks s now commonly referred to as the Japanese dsease.
Only when the bankng system was fundamentally restructured dd Japanese banks
start agan to fulﬁl ther credt ntermedaton functon and provde credt to new and
emergng ﬁrms nstead of old corporatons that were unproductve.
But, t s also useful to look at the current stuaton n Japan to draw out some lessons
for Europe. Prme mnster Shnzo Abe has started wth ‘Abenomcs’, one of the most
nterestng experments n economc hstory. Wth a ‘three arrows’ approach based on
a massve monetary expanson, ﬂexble ﬁscal polcy and plans for major structural
reform, the prmemnster ntends to overcome deﬂaton and re-nvgorate economc
growth. The ntalmonetary expanson had postve eﬀects on the Japanese economy.
Stock prces ncreased, the exchange rate deprecated sgnﬁcantly and deﬂaton rates
gradually came down and Japan may return to nﬂaton soon. However, many
challenges reman, n partcular for the thrd arrow, namely structural reforms to
ncrease productvty growth rates. These reforms are stll ongong and ther success
wll determne the ultmate success of Abenomcs. One could argue that only now s
there hope that all the consequences of the boom and bust n 1990 can be fully and
ﬁnally overcome.
Europe, n turn, s currently undergong one of ts most severe crses n recent hstory
wth smlar balance-sheet adjustments happenng n some parts of ts economy. In
Europe as n Japan, the role of monetary polcy and bankng polcy n addressng and
overcomng the crss s hotly debated. Also the approprate role of ﬁscal polcy and
structural reform s controversal n both economes.
Ths volume s dvded nto four parts coverng the ssues debated n depth durng the
conference on Japan and the EU n the global economy that took place at Bruegel n
October 2013.
The ﬁrst part focuses on the trade and ﬁnancal lnks between the two economes n a
perod of rsng emergngmarkets. The contrbuton by André Sapr proposes to look at
the eﬀects of Abenomcs on Europe. Europeans arewatchng Abenomcswth amxture
of hope and apprehenson. The hope s that the economc strategy wll succeed n
revvng the Japanese economy. Ths would obvously be desrable for the global
economy n general and for Europe n partcular, where growth has been dsmal for a
JAPAN AND THE EU IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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whle. At the same tme, there s some apprehenson that the yen, whch has
deprecated aganst the euro by about 40 percent snce September 2012, wll contnue
to fall, unleashng declnes of other Asan currences aganst the euro. The second
contrbuton s from Takuj Knkyo. Hs paper summarses the progress of economc
ntegraton n East Asa and dscusses how EU-Japan cooperaton can contrbute to
promotng further ntegraton. It examnes the current state of trade and ﬁnancal
ntegraton n East Asa and consders the polcy mplcatons. The progress of East
Asa’s regonal ﬁnancal safety net s assessed n the lght of the EUmodel to dscuss
what lessons for Asa can be drawn from the recent European economc crss. Fnally,
Mchael Plummer dscusses mega-regonalsm n Asan trade deals and the deep
nvolvement of Japan. He suggests that the EUhas a strong ncentve to lnkwth these
movements. Trade dversonmght be small n the aggregate but could be substantal
at the product level. An EU-Japan free-trade agreement would be a good step but t
should be part of a revval of the multlateral trade agenda.
The second part s a comparatve dscusson between Japanese and European experts
on housng bubbles, deleveragng and the approprate structural response. The ﬁrst
contrbuton by Tomom Myazak summarses the expanson and burstng of the
Japanese land-prce bubble n the late 1980s by analysng Japan’s economc polcy
durng that perod. Myazak then descrbes the ﬁscal polcy and corporate response
n the post-bubble perod. Publc nvestment used as part of the stmulus package had
asymmetrc eﬀects on corporate nvestment. The crowdng-out eﬀect observed n
Japan mght partly be attrbuted to the allocaton of publc nvestment. Investment
predomnantly to rural areas nstead of urban areas does not contrbute to promote
greater corporate nvestment but rather hnders t. The lesson for Europe s that publc
nvestment should be used for the rght purposes to address the massve drop n
demand. The second contrbuton s by Joachm Fels. Hs chapter shows how
‘Japanﬁcaton’ of the euro area s a serous rsk. He relates the Japanese narratve and
draws some parallels wth the euro area. However, he argues that Japanﬁcaton can
stll be avoded f euro-area polcymakers heed three lessons from Japan: ) Monetary
polcy should move early and aggressvely before deﬂaton manfests tself; )
Regulators should enforce a clean-up of bank balance sheets ncludng a realstc
assessment of bad assets and a swft recaptalsaton where needed; and )
Governments should avod overly tght ﬁscal polces that could plunge economes
back nto recesson. It s an mportant remnder for European polcymakers.
The thrd part studes and compares the monetary polcy response of the Bank of
Japan wth that of the European Central Bank, and the ﬁscal polcy response n the
context of a fragle ﬁnancal system. In the aftermath of the global ﬁnancal crss, a
JAPAN AND THE EU IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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number of major central banks mplemented unconventonal monetary polces
(UMPs). The ﬁrst paper by Waturu Takahash argues that UMPs are n theory and
practce problematc from the perspectve of central bank ndependence. As many
central banks are now requred to pursue three types of stablty – prce, ﬁnancal and
ﬁscal – there can be sgnﬁcant conﬂcts wth government. In addton, the lack of a
polcy rule for UMPs erodes accountablty. The author proposes here a new approach
to central bank ndependence from the vewpont of poltcal economy. The second
contrbuton by Zsolt Darvas s a dscusson of the paper by Takahash. Darvas
underscores the rsks to central bank ndependence n Japan resultng from the hgh
publc debt and budget deﬁct. A major challenge for the European Central Bank s to
avod ﬁscal or ﬁnancal stablty domnance n order to preserve credblty and
ndependence. Three man ssues are consdered: the need for and the eﬀectveness
of unconventonal monetary polces, the approprateness of ﬁscal adjustment
strateges durng the current crss and the problems wth low nﬂaton.
Fnally, part four s a dscusson between hgh-level polcymakers drawng lessons
and makng concrete polcy suggestons for Japan, Europe and ther economc
relatonshp.
The ﬁrst contrbuton by Kyohko G. Nshmura s a prelmnary assessment of
‘Abenomcs’ and the ‘bold’ monetary polcy of the Bank of Japan. Nshmura sees a
good chance of ultmate success for Abenomcs. Frst and foremost, the Japanese
economy s n a natural recovery phase from prolonged below-normal economc
actvtes caused by a seres of unexpected negatve shocks such as the Fukushma
nuclear power plant accdent. Second, the publc stll has a favourable percepton of the
Abe cabnet and ts economc polcy, whch brngs poltcal stablty. However, t s
absolutely necessary for the ultmate success of the Abenomcs to learn from past
polcy experence, summarsed n three dcta n the paper: avod wshful thnkng, be
proactve and communcate eﬀectvely. The ﬁnal contrbuton n the volume s from
Peter Praet, Member of the executve board of the European Central Bank. He argues
that protracted and large-scale balance sheet adjustments can weaken economc
actvty over a prolonged perod. Reparng the ﬁnancal sector was an mportant
element n mprovng the Japanese economy. The lesson for the euro appears to be
clear: the overhaul of the ﬁnancal archtecture needs to be accomplshed n ts
entrety.
The one-day conference allowed a number of mportant exchanges on the challenges
that Europe and Japan face. Clearly, Europe can learn from the Japanese experence.
It should be a top prorty for European polcymakers to avod fallng nto a Japanese
JAPAN AND THE EU IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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trap;more aggressvemonetary polcy and deep structural reform and ﬁnancal sector
reform are central n ths regard. We wll have to contnue watchng the (halfway)
results of Abenomcs and the response from Europe. Europe and Japan also have a
clear nterest n deepenng ther economc and trade tes, deally n an enhanced
multlateral trade framework. Japan, n turn, can learn frommany of the dscussons n
Europe, for example on central bank ndependence. Bruegel and Kobe wll contnue
the dalogue.
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Part 1:
Trade and ﬁnancial linkages
between Europe and Japan:
new evidence and scope for
improvement
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What Abenomics means for
EU-Japan trade relations
AndRé SAPIR
1. Introduction
For two decades the Japanese economy has suﬀered from deﬂaton and stagnant
nomnal GDP. Real GDP and per capta GDP have grown slghtly but only on the back of
chronc ﬁscal deﬁcts that have produced gross publc debts ofmore than 200percent
of GDP. After hs electon n December 2012, prmemnster Shnzo Abe decded to try
and end ths stuaton by adoptng a new economc strategy (‘Abenomcs’) nvolvng
three measures: ﬁscal expanson, monetary easng and growth-enhancng structural
reforms.
The ﬁrst two legs of the strategy were swftly adopted. In January 2013 the new
government adopted a ﬁscal stmulus of ¥10.3 trllon (€85 bllon) equvalent to about
two percent of GDP. And n Aprl 2013 the Bank of Japan under the leadershp of ts new
governor Haruhko Kuroda announced the launch of quanttatve and qualtatve easng
amed at fulﬁllng the prmemnster’s goal of two percent nﬂaton wthn two years.
The plan quckly changed themood n Japan. The Nkke 225 stockmarket ndex rose
bymore than 50 percent durng the ﬁrst ﬁve months after Shnzo Abe came to power.
And although the stock market dpped n June 2013 t has fully recovered snce. As a
result of ths postve economc sentment, the prmemnster easly won themd-term
Senate electon n July 2013, enablng the adopton of bold structural reforms, the
thrd leg of hs strategy. Unfortunately themeasures announced so far have been farly
modest.
One structural area n whch the Abe government hasmoved rapdly s trade. In March
2013, t launched negotatons wth the EU for a blateral free trade agreement (FTA).
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And n July 2013 Japan joned the US-led Trans-Pacﬁc Partnershp (TPP) ntatve that
seeks to create an FTA among countres of Asa, Australasa and the Amercas.
The nternatonal communty has been watchng Abenomcs wth great nterest.
Although somewhat worred that the yen deprecated aganst other currences by
nearly 20 percent n the ﬁrst ﬁve months after Mr. Abe came to power, t generally
vewed postvely the potental revval of the world’s thrd largest economy. Thus, at
ther Aprl 2013 Washngton meetng, G20 ﬁnance mnsters and central bank
governors gave ther approval to “Japan’s recent policy actions [that] are intended to
stop deflation and support domestic demand”.
In Europe, the reacton to Abenomcs has also generally been postve. But concerns
about the external value of the yen reman because the economc stuaton there
remans worrsome, wth GDP growth stll farly anemc. Both the hope of future
Japanese accelerated growth and the apprehenson about further yen deprecaton
aremagnﬁed by the prospect ofmore ntense EU-Japan trade relatons f andwhen the
blateral FTA s mplemented.
2. The eﬀects of Abenomics on Europe1
Japan’s economc polces could have mportant economc repercussons for EU- Japan
trade.
The Internatonal Monetary Fund (2013) attempted to analyse the eﬀects of
Abenomcs on the rest of Asa on the assumpton that Japan’s new economc strategy
produces hgher GDP growth, a more deprecated currency and lower nterest rates n
Japan than otherwse. Eﬀects on Asan partners would occur through two man
channels: ﬁnancal markets and trade.
Accordng to the IMF, a successful ext from deﬂaton and persstent yen deprecaton
could reduce the homebas of domestc Japanese nvestors and lead to a rebalancng
of ther portfolos to nclude a larger share of foregn assets, especally from Asa.
Hence, the ﬁnancal market eﬀect of Abenomcs on other Asan economes s lkely to
be postve.
At the same tme, the IMF predcts that stronger growth n Japan would beneﬁt
exporters n other Asan countres, especally those supplyng ﬁnal goods to Japan. A
EUROPE AND JAPAN: TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
10
1. Ths secton s partly based on Sapr (2013).
1893 Blueprint XXII 3/4/14 12:07 Page 10
weaker yen has less straghtforward mplcatons. For countres that drectly compete
wth Japan, ths may undermne ther compettveness. However, ths eﬀect s
mtgated by the fact that yen deprecaton also rases producton costs n Japan
because of the hgher costs of mported nputs. Lkewse,many countres n Asa mport
ntermedate goods from Japan, whch become cheaper wth yen deprecaton,
although possbly at the expense of domestc supplers. Hence, the trade eﬀect of yen
deprecaton s unlkely to be unform across Asan countres and would depend on
each country’s poston n the supply chan.
Stronger demand growth n Japan should also translate nto hgher exports for EU
supplers who would further beneﬁt from the EU-Japan FTA when t s mplemented.
Ths could reverse the recent downward trend n the share of Japan as a destination of
EU goods exports, whch has fallen from 5.4 percent n 2001 to 3.3 percent n 2012.
How much of ths potental wll be undermned by a weaker yen obvously depends
partly on how much the yen deprecates aganst European currences. The more t
does, the more t would also boost Japan’s exports, potentally to the detrment of EU
producton. A weaker yen could also reverse the strong downward trend n the share
of Japan as a supplier of EU goods mports, whch has dropped from 8.3 percent n
2001 to 3.6 percent n 2012.
Snce the electon of Mr. Abe as leader of hs party and contender for the post of prme
mnster under the banner of Abenomcs on 26 September 2012, the yen has
deprecated bymore than 30 percent aganst the dollar and bymore than 40 percent
aganst the euro. On 17 January 2014 t stood at ¥104 aganst the dollar and at ¥141
aganst the euro, compared to, respectvely, ¥78 and ¥100 on 26 September 2012.
Wll the fall of the yen contnue?
Japanese analysts generally regard the current yen level as ‘far’, but consder further
deprecaton problematc. For nstance, Kazumasa Iwata, a former Bank of Japan
deputy governor who s nowpresdent of the Japan Centre for Economc Research, has
ndcated that he “believes the yen is fairly valued at ¥100 to the dollar, but that further
weakness would represent a market ‘overreaction’ and ‘could cause problems’ for
Japan’s economy” (Ross et al, 2013). Smlarly, Koj Sakuma, General Manager and
Chef Economst at the Insttute for Internatonal Monetary Aﬀars, wrote n 2013 that
“the current level at around ¥95 against the US dollar ismore or less a fair level. In this
regard, the recent depreciation can be regarded as an adjustment of the overvaluation
which emerged under the extreme strain of the global financial market after the
Lehman shock and can be justified theoretically and internationally, therefore.
EUROPE AND JAPAN: TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
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However, excessive depreciation beyond thismight annoy other nations and even be
harmful to the Japanese economy” (Sakuma, 2013).
The IMF ntally ndcated that the lower yen level was ‘approprate’, but later warned
that t has become “moderately below what would be consistent with medium-term
norms”. And wth currency strategsts predctng a yen soon fallng to 110 aganst the
dollar, nternatonal dssatsfacton may be brewng. Two developments pont n ths
drecton.
Frst, the US Treasury has on several occasons warned that t s “closely monitoring”
Japan’s economc polces to ensure that t “refrain[s] from competitive devaluation
and targeting its exchange rate for competitive purposes” (US Treasury, 2013). And
whle t s true that the US Federal Reserve has engaged n monetary polces smlar
to the Bank of Japan’s, ther exchange rate eﬀects seem to have been small. A study
of the nternatonal eﬀects of unconventonal US monetary polcy such as ‘Operaton
Twst’ (OT) by the IMF found that there was “a significant, but generally short-lived,
impact on bilateral exchange rates. OT, on the other hand,was accompanied bya sharp
appreciation of the US dollar as ‘flight to safety’ by investorsmore than compensated
for any depreciation effect from the Fed actions” (IMF, 2012). A smlar eﬀect s unlkely
n the case of the yen. On the other hand, the Japanese authortes are well aware that
further yen deprecaton would endanger Japan’s export compettveness because of
the rsng cost of mports, whch are largely nvoced n US dollars.
Second, n May 2013 the Bank of Korea unexpectedly cut nterest rates, ctng the
damagng eﬀect that the weaker yen s havng on ts exports2 If ths move were
followed by a sgnﬁcant deprecaton of the Korean won, and perhaps of other Asan
currences, lke the Tawanese dollar, t would lkely rase concerns about ‘Factory Asa’
not only n ‘Factory North Amerca’ but also n ‘Factory Europe’3 Deprecaton of the
Chnese yuan s, however, generally regarded as less lkely, both because t could fuel
ﬁnancal nstablty n Chna and because of the fear of trade retalaton.
So far, there has been lttle oﬃcal (or otherwse) reacton n Europe to Abenomcs and
ts consequences, except to say, as European Central Bank PresdentMaro Dragh dd
EUROPE AND JAPAN: TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
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2. The sameweek, New Zealand’s central bank admtted ntervenng n the currencymarket to try toweaken ts dollar,
whch has come under pressure n part because of the weaker yen. Moreover, Australa cut nterest rates, havng
prevously warned that ts exchange rate was too strong.
3. Factory Asa, Factory Europe and Factory North Amerca are the three regonal supply chans, that domnate global
producton and trade organsed around, respectvely, Japan (but also ncreasngly Korea and Chna), Germany
(and other large EU countres) and the US. See Baldwn and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013).
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n Aprl 2013, that Japan’s polcy ofmonetary easng s “determined by domestic policy
considerations” and that “there is no currency war”. In part ths s due to the fact that
n 2012 Japan only accounted for 3.6 percent of EU merchandse mports and 3.3
percent of EU exports (compared to, respectvely, 9.3 percent and 5.4 percent n
2000)4 As a result, despte an apprecaton of the euro aganst the yen of nearly 30
percent between September 2012 and Aprl 2013, the Bank for Internatonal Settle-
ment (BIS) estmated that the nomnal eﬀectve exchange rate of the euro had ‘only’
apprecated by 4.8 percent thanks to the euro’s deprecaton aganst, inter alia, the US
dollar, the Chnese yuan and the Korean won. However, between Aprl and December
2013, the euro further apprecated not only aganst the yen but also on amultlateral
bass. Thus, by December 2013 the euro had apprecated by 40 percent aganst the
yen compared to September 2012 and by 10.9 percent on a nomnal eﬀectve bass.
These developments clearly add to the problems of the euro area and n partcular of
ts perpheral members, whch are strugglng wth hgh debt levels and low com-
pettveness.
3. Conclusion
Europeans arewatchng Abenomcswth amx of hope and apprehenson. The hope s
that the economc strategywll succeed n revvng the Japanese economy. Thswould
obvously be desrable for the global economy n general and for Europe n partcular,
where growth has been dsmal for a whle. At the same tme, there s some appre-
henson that the yen, whch has deprecated aganst the euro by about 40 percent
snce September 2012, wll contnue to fall, unleashng declnes of other Asan
currences aganst the euro. An mportant open queston concerns the mpact of the
yen-euro exchange rate on the EU-Japan FTA negotaton. A further deprecaton of the
yen would rsk rasng worres n Europe that the envsaged deal s too favourable for
Japan and could therefore be opposed or even blocked by mport-competng European
producers. Yet Japan’s mproved compettvenessmght n fact mpact Korean exports
to the EU, whch now enjoy free access thanks to the EU-Korea FTA,more strongly that
t wll mpact European producers.
EUROPE AND JAPAN: TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
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4. The ﬁgures are obvously much hgher for Factory Asa, wth Chna, Japan and Korea together accountng for 21.9
percent of EU mports and 14 percent of EU exports.
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East Asia’s economic integration:
progress made and implications
for EU-Japan cooperation
TAkUJI kInkYO
Whle the blateral relatonshp between the European Unon and Japan contnues to
be mportant, the scope of EU-Japan cooperaton needs to be broadened n the context
of East Asa’s economc ntegraton. Intra-regonal economc ntegraton has been a
key drvng force for East Asa’s rapd ndustralsaton and growth, fromwhch both the
EU and Japan have beneﬁted a great deal. The European Unon and Japan should
collaborate to further promote trade and ﬁnancal ntegraton n East Asa.
Ths chapter breﬂy summarses of the progress of economc ntegraton n East Asa
and dscusses how EU-Japan cooperaton can contrbute to promotng further
ntegraton. Sectons 1 and 2, respectvely, examne the current state of trade and
ﬁnancal ntegraton n East Asa and consder the polcy mplcatons. Secton 3 revews
the progress of East Asa’s regonal ﬁnancal safety net and dscusses what Asa can
learn from the recent European economc crss. Secton 4 concludes.
1. Trade integration in East Asia
1.1 Supply chains and intra-regional trade
East Asa, whch ncludes greater Chna (manland Chna, Hong Kong and Tawan),
Japan, Korea and the Assocaton of Southeast Asan Natons (ASEAN), has recently
wtnessed a rapd ncrease n ntra-regonal trade. A notable feature of the area’s ntra-
regonal trade s a hgh proporton of ntermedate goods, such as parts and
components (Fgure 1).
EUROPE AND JAPAN: TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
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Figure 1: Intra-regional trade in East Asia
Source: RIETI-Japan, RIETI–TID 2012, http://www.ret.go.jp.
The large share of ntermedate goods reﬂects the spread of vertcally-ntegrated
supply chans wthn the regon (Ando and Kmura, 2005; Fukao et al, 2003). Behnd
ths regonal trend, there s a more global phenomenon of what has been called
“globalisation’s second unbundling” (Baldwn, 2006). The nformaton and com-
muncaton technology (ICT) revoluton has enabled the producton process to be
decomposed nto smaller sub-processes and has allowed each sub-process to be
located n the most cost-eﬀectve country.
Regonal supply chans aremore extensve n East Asa than n other regons because
of favourable trade- and nvestment-related polces, large nter-country wage
dﬀerentals and eﬃcent logstcs (Gll and Kharas, 2007). Developng Asan
economes have been able to speed up the process of ndustralsaton by jonng
regonal supply chans, whch provde a better opportunty to explot comparatve
advantages and economes of scale. In ths mportant way, regonal economc
ntegraton and economc development are closely nterrelated n East Asa.
Chna has been deeply engaged n Asa’s supply chans and has successfully
establshed tself as an assembly hub. In tandem, Japan, Korea and Tawan have
become major supplers of hgh-qualty ntermedate goods to Chna. Fgure 2 shows
the decomposton of gross exports by value-added sources. The share of foregn
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value-added n Chna’s exports s hgh n comparson wth other major exporters of
manufactured goods. Chna has also served as an export platform for multnatonal
enterprses. The local subsdares ofmultnatonal enterprses have contrbuted a great
deal to Chna’s exports. More than half of Chna’s exports and mports are accounted for
by foregn nvestors (Fgure 3). Therefore, Chna can be charactersed as a gateway for
the exports of Factory Asa.
Figure 2: The share of foreign value-added in gross exports, selected countries
Source: OECD-WTO Trade n Value Added (TVA) 2013.
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It should, however, be emphassed that East Asa s by no means a self-contaned
economy. East Asa’s exports of ﬁnal goods are heavly dependent on extra-regonal
markets, notably Europe and the Unted States. As Fgure 4 shows, the market share
of extra-regons s much hgher n the export of ﬁnal goods than n the export of
ntermedate and prmary goods.
The mportance of extra-regonal demand s more pronounced when exports are
measured n value-added terms5. Table 1 shows the market share of Asa’s exports
both n gross and value-added terms. The share of extra-regons, partcularly the EUand
US, s sgnﬁcantly greater n value-added exports than n gross exports n major East
5. Ths measures the value added by each ndustry and country n the producton chan, and allocates the value
added to these source ndustres and countres. It recognses that growng global supply chans mean that a
country’s exports ncreasngly rely on ntermedate mports. The data s avalable for more than 40 countres from
1995 to 2009. For more detals, vst the OECD’s webste (www.oecd.org/st/nd/whatstradenvalueadded.htm).
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Figure 3: China’s export/import shares by type of enterprise
Source: CEIC Database. Note: SOE = state-owned enterprse, FIE: foregn nvestment enterprse.
Figure 4: The market share of extra-regions in East Asia’s exports
Source: RIETI-Japan, RIETI–TID 2012, http://www.ret.go.jp.
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Asan economes. One possble explanaton for ths dﬀerence s that hgh-qualty
products are manly sold n extra-regonal economes that have greater purchasng
power. Therefore, Asan economes relymore heavly on extra-regonal demand for GDP
growth and job creaton than s ndcated by gross exports. A key polcy mplcaton of
ths ﬁndng s that foregn trade agreements (FTAs)wth extra-regons, partcularlywth
the EU and the Unted States, are mportant to Asa to enhance ts export
compettveness and thus mantan export-led growth.
Table 1: Market share of exports in gross and value-added terms
(%)
East Asia Japan China Extra- EU15 US
Regions
Gross Trade Japan 46.6 – 20.3 53.4 13.2 16.6
Korea 47.0 6.1 28.3 53.0 9.7 12.1
Chna 24.1 8.7 – 75.9 20.7 22.6
ASEAN6 30.5 8.6 14.1 69.5 13.9 12.7
Value-Added Japan 32.2 – 14.0 67.8 16.9 21.3
Trade Korea 29.8 7.1 14.9 70.2 15.0 19.4
Chna 18.8 8.5 – 81.2 22.3 24.0
ASEAN6 24.3 10.2 9.2 75.7 16.5 16.6
Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 2013. Note: 1. Data for 2009; 2. ASEAN+6: Indonesa, Malaysa,
Phlppnes, Sngapore, Thaland, Vetnam; 3. EU15: Austra, Belgum, Denmark, Fnland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Span, Sweden, Unted Kngdom.
1.2 Asia’s FTAs: beneﬁts and challenges
Over the past two decades, there has been a rapd prolferaton of FTAs across theworld
presumably as a result of slow progress n multlateral trade negotatons. Although
East Asa prevously lagged behnd the global trend, the number of Asan FTAs began
to ncrease n the 2000s. Currently, there are more than 70 FTAs n the regon, wth
more to be agreed n the near future.
An FTA wll have a postve trade-creaton eﬀect on ts member countres. However, an
FTA could also have an adverse trade-dverson eﬀect on non-FTA member countres.
Concerns about the latter wll ncrease pressure on non-FTA member countres to
partcpate n FTAs, facltatng the spread of FTAs among countres wth close trade
lnkages. Sols et al (2009) argue that such a ‘domno eﬀect’ was one of the key drvng
forces behnd the rapd spread of FTAs across the Asa-Pacﬁc regon.
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FTAs can contrbute to the further expanson of Asa’s supply chans by reducng both
cross-border mpedments and non-border regulatory barrers for trade and
nvestment. However, despte the huge potental of FTAs n the regon, East Asa fals
to fully explot the beneﬁts of FTAs because of varous problems.
Frst, the coverage of products dﬀers sgnﬁcantly across Asa’s FTAs (see Table 2). In
partcular, the coverage of agrculture s low n someof the FTAs because of poltcal and
economc concerns over the mpact of free trade on domestc sectors. Accordng to
Kawa and Wgnaraja (2013), 46 percent of the sampled FTAs n Asa have
comprehensve coverage of agrcultural products, 28 percent have some coverage,
and 26 percent have lttle or no coverage6. Gven the recprocal nature of FTAs, the
excluson of agrcultural products s lkely to lmt the scope of trade lberalsaton of
other products.
Table 2: The coverage of products in Asia’s FTAs
(%)
Japan (JP) JP-Sngapore 75
JP-Phlppnes 69
JP-ASEAN 69
JP-Inda 69
Chna (CN) CN-ASEAN 81
CN-Tawan 38
Korea (KR) KR-ASEAN 56
KR-Sngapore 81
KR-EU 88
KR-USA 100
Sngapore (SG) SG-EFTA 81
SG-US 56
Traspacfc Strategc EPA 75
ASEAN AFTA 44
Source: Kawa and Wgnaraja (2013)
Second, there s a great deal of room for promotng servce-trade lberalsaton.
Although trade n servces s expandng rapdly, there are varyng degrees of
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6. Comprehensve coveragemeans that at least 85 percent of agrcultural products are covered or that nomore than
150 products are excluded from an FTA. Some coveragemeans thatmore than 100 products are ncluded but less
than 85 percent of products are covered. Lttle or no coverage means that fewer than 100 products are ncluded.
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restrctons on servces n dﬀerent Asan countres n terms of the coverage of sectors
and the severty of restrctons. The coverage of servces also vares consderably n
dﬀerent Asan FTAs. Kawa and Wgnaraja (2013) select ﬁve key servce sectors,
namely, busness and professonal servces, communcatons servces, ﬁnancal
servces, transport servces and labour moblty/entry of busness persons, n order
to assess ther coverage by Asan FTAs. They ﬁnd that 45 percent of the FTAs cover all
ﬁve sectors, 23 percent cover two to four sectors, and 32 percent cover one sector or
none. Although themajorty of Asan FTAs have some coverage of servces, the extent
of lberalsaton dﬀers sgnﬁcantly among them.
Servces lberalsatonwll not only facltate trade n servcesper sebutwll also reduce
the cost of servce lnks, such as communcaton and transportaton lnks that connect
dspersed sub-processes n the supply chans. Golub, Jones, and Kerzkow (2007)
provde evdence that successful manufacturng exporters, notably n East Asa, have
favourable servce lnks. It should also be noted that the development of modern
servce sectors, such as the ICT and ﬁnancal sectors, s mportant for mddle-ncome
countres to sustan economc development and thereby avod the ‘mddle-ncome
trap’7.
Fnally, the presence of complex and nconsstent rules of orgn (ROOs) n Asan FTAs
can deter nter-FTA trade, whch s a phenomenon known as the ‘spaghett-bowl’ eﬀect
(Bhagwat, 1995). Someauthors have argued that the spaghett-bowl eﬀect s a serous
problem n Asa because the ROOs of Asan FTAs are overly restrctve and nconsstent
(Manchn and Pelkmans-Balaong, 2007; Tumbarello, 2007). However, Kawa and
Wgnaraja (2013), nterpretng the data from the ﬁrm-level survey, argue that the
exstence of multple ROOs could be a future problem, but has not yet become a
problem. Moreover, Medalla (2011) ﬁnds that there s a substantal degree of
commonalty n the ROOs of ﬁve ASEAN+1 FTAs, though consderable varatons stll
exst among these FTAs8. These results ndcate that the beneﬁt of Asa’s FTAs can be
ncreased by ratonalsng and harmonsng the ROOs.
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7. Themddle-ncome trap s a phenomenonofmddle-ncomecountres, whch struggle tomantan ther rapd growth
and therefore fal to graduate nto the ranks of hgh-ncome countres (Gll and Kharas, 2007, pp17-18).
8. Fve ASEAN+1 FTAs nclude ASEAN-Australa-New Zealand FTA, ASEAN-Chna FTA, ASEAN-Inda FTA, ASEAN-Japan
FTA and ASEAN-Korea FTA.
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1.3 The catalyst role of the EU-Japan FTA
In addton to the problemsdscussed above, Asa’s FTAs have amajor drawback related
to ther geographcal coverage. As Table 3 shows, major ntra-regonal FTAs have
evolved around ASEAN. In contrast, there s no FTA between Chna, Korea and Japan,
though these three countres eventually launched negotatons for a trpartte FTA n
November 2012. A regon-wde FTA that covers all major economes wll ncrease total
welfare gans. In partcular, trade and nvestment lberalsatonwll facltate the spread
of supply chans and therefore contrbute to enhancng the productvty of Factory
Asa.
Table 3: FTAs in Greater Asia
Japan China korea ASEAn India Australia new Zealand
Japan △ ◯* ⌾ ⌾ ◯ ✕
Chna △ ◯ ⌾ △ ◯ ⌾
Korea ◯* ◯ ⌾ ⌾ ◯ ◯
ASEAN ⌾ ⌾ ⌾ ⌾ ⌾
Inda ⌾ △ ⌾ ⌾ △ △
Australa ◯ ◯ ◯ ⌾ △ ◯
New Zealand ✕ ⌾ ◯ △ ⌾
Source: Kawa and Wgnaraja (2013), Mnstry of Foregn Aﬀars, Japan. Note: ⌾ eﬀectve/sgned; ◯ under
negotaton; △ under feasblty study;✕ = no oﬃcal acton. * JP-KR negotaton s suspended. JP, CN and KR
launched negotatons n November 2012.
Recognsng the mportance of a regon-wde FTA, greater Asan countres, ncludng
Inda, Australa andNew Zealand, launched negotatons for an FTA called the Regonal
Comprehensve Economc Partnershp (RCEP) n November 2012. The RCEP ams to
reach an agreement n three areas: trade lberalsaton (reducng tarﬀ and non-tarﬀ
barrers), trade facltaton (ratonalsng and harmonsng ROOs, custom-clearance
procedures, standards and regulatons) and economc cooperaton (supportng less
advanced economes). Accordng to the smulaton analyss by the Comprehensve
Economc Partnershp n East Asa (CEPEA) Study Group (2009), the RCEP wll
sgnﬁcantly ncrease the GDP n all member countres f the full eﬀect of trade
lberalsaton n combnatonwth trade facltaton and economc cooperaton s taken
nto account. Petr, Plummer and Zha (2012) perform a more comprehensve
smulaton on the economc eﬀect of the TPP and a regon-wde Asan FTA. In ther
updated smulatons (avalable at www.asapacﬁctrade.org), they show that the RCEP
wll ncrease the total ncome of member countres by more than US$ 570 bllon
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(expressed n 2007 US dollars) per year n 2025. However, notwthstandng the
potental beneﬁts of the RCEP,major dﬀerences exst between Chna, Korea and Japan
n terms of the scope and depth of lberalsaton. Therefore, there s a serous rsk of
substantal compromse that wll reduce the economc beneﬁts of the RCEP.
Parallel to the RCEP, Japan has actvely engaged n trade negotatons wth extra-
regonal economes. Japan launched an FTA negotaton wth the EU n March 2013,
followed by partcpaton n the Trans-Pacﬁc Partnershp (TPP) trade negotaton n
July 2013. Such an omndrectonal approach to trade polcy seems to reﬂect Japan’s
tradton of placng greater mportance onmultlateral trade lberalsaton. It also seems
to reﬂect the recognton that Factory Asa s hghly dependent on the EU and theUS for
ts exports.
Froma strategc pont of vew, Japan canmake use of the negotatons on the EU-Japan
FTA and the TPP as a catalyst to facltate RCEP negotatons. A successful concluson
on these hgh-qualty FTAsmght not only ncrease the pressure to accelerate the RCEP
negotatons, but also sets a benchmark for the qualty of the RCEP. Plummer (2007)
llustrates the usefulness of dentfyng the FTA best practces and applyng them to the
assessment of FTA qualty. The RCEP member countres can employ such a best-
practces approach n settng a benchmark for ther trade negotatons. The EU and
Japan shouldmake asmuch eﬀort as possble to reach a hgh-qualty trade agreement
both n terms of scope and depth, whch wll provde a useful benchmark for the RCEP
and other subsequent FTAs.
2. financial integration in East Asia
2.1 Cross-border capital market integration
Whle East Asa’s economc ntegraton has been led by foregn trade and foregn drect
nvestment, the regon’s economc ntegraton through ﬁnancal transactons, partcu-
larly portfolo nvestment, has lagged. When compared wth Europe, the level of
cross-border portfolo nvestment smuch lower and ts share of ntra-regonal ﬂows n
total nvestment s smaller n Asa (Pongsparn and Unterberdoerster, 2011).
The promoton of cross-border captalmarket ntegraton through portfolo nvestment
can ncrease the eﬃcency of the allocaton of funds n varous ways. Greater access
to foregn captal markets wll provde opportuntes for domestc ﬁrms and govern-
ments to rase funds at lower costs. Lkewse, cross-border access to ﬁnancal products
and servces wll allow domestc nvestors to dversfy rsks.
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Captal market ntegraton can also facltate the development of domestc ﬁnancal
systems. Openng alternatve channels for ﬁnancal ntermedaton wll expose
domestc banks to competton, whch wll encourage banks to mprove servces and
operatonal eﬃcency. In addton, greater foregn partcpaton n domestc captal
marketswll lead to better prce dscovery and less prce volatlty by mprovngmarket
lqudty and exertng pressure for better corporate governance (Prasad and Rajan,
2008). Furthermore, deep and lqud captal markets can serve as a fallback n the
event of severe dsruptons to the bank ﬁnancng channel (Felman et al, 2011).
Table 4 shows the cross-border holdngs of portfolo nvestment assets and labltes
relatve to GDP. The data source s the IMF’s Coordnated Portfolo Investment Survey.
Because of dﬀerences n data coverage, only the labltes of debt and equty
securtes are reported for Chna, Tawan and Vetnam. The levels of debt securtes are
relatvely low n Asan economes. In partcular, the levels of debt assets are
sgnﬁcantly below the average of G20 advanced economes. The exceptons are Hong
Kong and Sngapore, whch serve as the regon’smajor nternatonal ﬁnancal centres.
However, the levels of debt securtes are also low n G20 non-East Asa emergng
economes, ndcatng that nactve cross-border debt nvestment s not necessarly a
unque feature to Asa.
Apart fromHongKong and Sngapore, the levels of equty assets are sgnﬁcantly lower
on average n Asan economes than n advanced economes. By contrast, the levels
of equty labltes n Korea, Malaysa and Tawan are as hgh as the average level n
advanced economes. In G20 advanced economes, the cross-country average levels
of debt assets and labltes are hgher than the levels of equty assets and labltes.
Conversely, the levels of equty assets and labltes are generally hgher than the
levels of debt assets and labltes n Asan economes.
In sum, the levels of cross-border portfolo nvestment are relatvely low n emergng
Asa apart from Hong Kong and Sngapore. Although nward equty nvestment has
been actve n some Asan economes, debt nvestment generally remans relatvely
stagnant n both drectons.
Why s Asa’s cross-border captal market ntegraton laggng? There are several
potental mpedments to Asa’s cross-border nvestment, partcularly bond
nvestment. Frst, the bond markets n Asa are underdeveloped n terms of market
sze and lqudty. Although the bondmarkets have grown rapdly over the past decade,
total bonds outstandng reman lower n most Asan economes than n advanced
economes. The major exceptons are Korea and Malaysa, where compared to other
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Asan economes, bond markets are much larger and more dversﬁed among
government, corporate and ﬁnancal nsttutons.
The lack of lqudty n local markets could also be a serous obstacle to cross-border
nvestment. Asa’s bond markets, partcularly corporate bond markets are much less
lqud than bond markets n advanced economes (Ghosh, 2006). Investors wll be
dscouraged from nvestng n llqud bond markets where prce dscovery s not
functonngwell and prce volatlty tends to be great. Market lqudty can be mproved
by establshngmarketmakers, ntroducngmodern tradng platforms, and upgradng
payments and settlement systems (Goswam and Sharma, 2011).
In a smlar ven, broadenng the base of domestc nsttutonal nvestors, such as
penson funds, nsurance companes andmutual funds, s mportant to mprovemarket
lqudty. Although the asset sze of domestc nsttutonal nvestors remans relatvely
small, there s substantal scope for ncreasng the coverage of pensons and nsurance
n most emergng Asan countres (see Table 5). In addton, regulatons on the
nvestment of penson funds and nsurance companes are generally conservatve,
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Table 4: Cross-border holdings of portfolio investment assets/liabilities
(Ratio to GdP; %)
Bond securities Equity securities
Assets liabilities Assets liabilities
Chna – 1.0 – 7.4
Hong Kong 153.6 10.0 260.2 132.9
Indonesa 0.8 6.0 0.1 8.4
Korea 3.0 14.6 8.5 25.6
Malaysa 4.6 21.6 10.5 22.8
Phlppnes 2.9 13.4 0.0 8.4
Sngapore 91.9 18.2 87.2 59.1
Tawan – 3.1 – 43.2
Thaland 5.6 4.0 1.6 17.2
Vetnem – 3.1 – 2.6
Average for
G20 advanced economes 44.0 53.9 28.0 27.3
G20 non-East Asa emergng economes 1.3 6.2 5.4 12.7
Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. Note: 1. Data for 2010; 2. G20 advanced economes: Australa,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US; 3. G20 non-East Asa emergng economes: Argentna, Brazl, Inda,
Mexco, Russa, Saud Araba, South Afrca, Turkey.
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lmtng the scope for dversfyng nvestment allocatons. Governments can promote
the development of nsttutonal nvestors by adoptng nternatonal best practces for
these regulatons.
Table 5: Institutional investors in East Asia
life insurance mutual fund Pension fund
premium volume assets assets
to GdP (%) to GdP (%) to GdP (%)
2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2010
Japan 6.6 *7.1 16.4 12.7 23.8 23.7
Korea 7.7 7.2 31.4 20.3 3.9 3.9
Chna 1.7 2.1 12.4 4.6 – 0.7
Indonesa 1.1 *1.1 – – 2.2 –
Malaysa 3.1 2.9 25.3 28.3 47.8 –
Phlppnes 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.1 – 3.5
Sngapore 5.8 5.2 – – 51.0 60.0
Thaland 2.3 3.1 18.8 – 5.2 5.7
Vetnam 0.8 0.6 0.3 – – –
Unted States 4.0 3.7 82.0 77.6 77.0 69.2
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development. Note: * Data for 2010.
The second potental mpedment s the legal rsk. There are sgnﬁcant legal rsks n
cross-border portfolo nvestment because of the nformaton gap on regulatory
frameworks, whch dﬀer across Asa n many respects. Therefore, t s mportant to
ncrease transparency by mprovng access to local nformaton on laws and
regulatons and on market practces. Eﬀort should also be made to promote
harmonsaton n key regulatons and practces through regonal ﬁnancal cooperaton
Thrd, there s greater foregn exchange uncertanty that could dscourage nvestment.
Dervatve markets, such as foregn exchange future, swaps and optons, reman
underdeveloped, and there are few eﬀectve nstruments nmost Asan economes to
hedge foregn exchange rsks. In addton, a majorty of Asan economes mantan
varyng degrees of control over the nternatonal use of domestc currences to prevent
harmful speculatve attacks. The development of dervatvemarkets and the facltated
nternatonalsaton of domestc currency are necessary to encourage cross-border
portfolo nvestments.
Lastly, the presence of relatvely strngent captal controls can be amajor mpedment.
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Table 6 shows the ndex of captal controls on portfolo nvestment n major Asan
economes9. Overall, the captal control s relatvely strngent n Asan economes,
except n Hong Kong, Korea and Sngapore. Interestngly, controls on captal outﬂows
are generally tghter than those on captal nﬂows n Asan economes presumably
because of ther greater concerns about captal ﬂght. The removal of excessve captal
controls could be a drvng force for cross-border bond nvestment and furthermarket
ntegraton n Asa.
Table 6: Capital flow index on portfolio investment
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9. The ndex s constructed by Schndler (2009) usng the nformaton provded n the IMF’s Annual Report Exchange
Rate Arrangements and Restrctons.
Year Inflows Outflows
Chna 1997 1.0 1.0
2000 1.0 1.0
2005 1.0 1.0
Hong Kong 1997 0.0 0.0
2000 0.0 0.0
2005 0.0 0.0
Indonesa 1997 0.3 0.3
2000 0.5 0.5
2005 0.5 0.5
Korea 1997 0.8 0.3
2000 0.0 0.5
2005 0.0 0.3
Year Inflows Outflows
Malaysa 1997 0.5 1.0
2000 0.5 1.0
2005 0.5 1.0
Phlppnes 1997 0.5 1.0
2000 0.5 1.0
2005 1.0 1.0
Sngapore 1997 0.0 0.3
2000 0.0 0.5
2005 0.0 0.5
Thaland 1997 0.8 1.0
2000 0.5 0.8
2005 0.8 1.0
Source: Schndler (2009). Note: The ndex s the average of the ndces for equty and bond nvestment. The
strctness of captal controls s measured by the scale between 0 and 1. A larger value of the ndex mples more
strngent controls.
2.3 ASEAN capital market integration
Among polcymakers n the ASEAN countres, there has been a shared recognton of
the need to develop ntegrated regonal captal markets. Captal markets n the ASEAN
countres are ndvdually small and llqud: therefore, transacton costs are relatvely
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hgh.Moreover, the varetes of products and servces are lmted and the nvestor base
remans narrow. Greater access to foregn nvestors and ssuers through market
ntegraton wll ncrease the lqudty of domestc markets and broaden the range of
products and servces.
Aganst such a background, ASEAN ﬁnance mnsters endorsed an Implementaton
Plan at ther regular meetng n 200910. The objectve of the Implementaton Plan was
to promote the development of an ntegrated captal market, whch s an ntegral part
of the ASEAN Economc Communty (AEC) Blueprnt 2015. The AEC Blueprnt 2015,
whchwas agreed upon by ASEAN leaders n 2007, ams to establsh ASEAN as a sngle
market and producton base, wth a free ﬂow of goods, servces, nvestments and
sklled workers, and a freer ﬂow of captal. The Implementaton Plan seeks to acheve
the goal of freer captal ﬂows by provdng a comprehensve set of strategc ntatves
and formulatng specﬁc mplementaton actons andmlestones.
One of the mportant characterstcs of the Implementaton Plan was ts gradual and
phased approach tomarket ntegraton11. Instead of settng an ambtous target of full
convergence of regulatons and standards, the Implementaton Plan ntends to create
an enablng envronment for cross-border access by promotng themutual recognton
and harmonsaton of local regulatons and standards. In addton, the Implementaton
Plan ams to facltate the allance of the ASEAN countres’ stock exchanges to
encourage cross-border tradng of lsted stocks. It also seeks to promote regonally
focused products to buld awareness of ASEAN as an asset class. Furthermore, eﬀorts
wll be made to strengthen the mplementaton process by algnng domestc captal-
market development plans to regonal ntatves and by renforcng the ASEAN-level
workng mechansm by settng up a coordnaton team nsde the ASEAN secretarat.
Box 1 summarses the strategc components of the Implementaton Plan. These
measureswll be undertaken n stages. For example, themutual recognton framework
wll be ntally establshed blaterally between partes, andmultlateral arrangements
wll be subsequently developed when countres wth less-advanced captal markets
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10. The Implementaton Planwas drafted and proposed by the ASEAN Captal Market Forum, whch s comprsed of the
heads of securtes regulators n ASEANmember countres.
11. The Implementaton Plan s guded by sx key prncples: (1) Adopton of nternatonal standards to themaxmum
extent possble; (2) Progressve lberalsaton to facltate more open access and cost reducton through greater
competton; (3) Sequencng of regonal ntegraton ntatves takng nto account the ease of mplementaton,
market preferences and techncal lnkages; (4) Adequate coordnaton of the ASEAN-level workng processes; (5)
Consstent mplementaton of polces to support regonal ntegraton at the country level, wth eﬀectvemontorng
mechansms; and (6) Strong communcaton plannng and consultatve processes to buld consensus and set
prortes for ntegraton ntatves.
1893 Blueprint XXII 3/4/14 12:07 Page 28
are ready to jon. Lkewse, cross-border access to foregn products and servces wll
be made possble for non-retal nvestors and then retal nvestors when adequate
nvestor protecton measures are n place.
Such a step-by-step approach to market ntegraton appears to be approprate gven
the wde dscrepancy n ncome levels and stage of ﬁnancal development of ASEAN
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BOX 1: STRATEGIC COMPONENTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
I. Mutual recognition framework to facilitate:
• Cross-border fund rasng
• Product dstrbuton
• Cross-border nvestments wthn ASEAN
• Market access by ntermedares
II. ASEAN exchange alliance and governance framework
• Buld tradng lnkages and setup ASEAN Board
• Enhance governance, tradng eﬃcency and cost reducton
• Clearng, depostory and settlement lnkage
• Marketng and nvestor educaton
III. Promote new products and build ASEAN as an asset class
• Promote prvate sector led regonal products development
• Promote ASEAN star companes under the ASEAN board
IV. Strengthen bondmarkets
• Accelerate reform ntatves n bond ssuance, lstng and dstrbuton
• Desgn a regonal strategy for ratngs comparablty
• Improve market lqudty, and clearng & settlement of lnkages
V. Align domestic CMDP to support regional integration
• Algn natonal development ntatves to support cross border ntegraton
• Adopt phased approach to lberalsaton to ensure domestcmarket readness
VI. Reinforce ASEAN working process
• Establsh ASEANCoordnatng Team, comprsng dedcated resources fromASEC
anddedcated pont persons fromACMFmembers tomontor, coordnate, report
and rase ssues on the Implementaton Plan.
Source: The Implementation Plan endorsed at the ASEAN Fnance Mnsters Meetng n 2009.
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countres. In partcular, there are sgnﬁcant gaps n countres’ regulatory capacty and
market nfrastructure. These gaps could be serous obstacles to the process of
ntegraton. It s therefore mportant to provde less-advanced countreswth techncal
assstance that wll support ther eﬀorts to buld regulatory capacty and market
nfrastructures. The EU and Japan should collaborate to take a leadng role n
coordnatng such assstance wthn the Asan regon and n ﬁllng the gap n fundng
resources.
3. Regional ﬁnancial safety net12
Emergngmarket economes are ncreasngly exposed to the rsk of ﬁnancal nstablty
posed by the acceleraton of ﬁnancal globalsaton. Followng the Asan ﬁnancal crss
of 1997-98, ASEAN and Chna, Japan and Korea (ASEAN+3) establshed a regonal
ﬁnancal safety net known as the ChangMa Intatve (CMI). The core objectve of the
CMI was to create a network of blateral swap agreements (BSAs) among the ASEAN+3
members, partcularly between the plus-three countres and the ASEAN members.
Through ths arrangement, member countres could save the cost of balance-of-
payments nsurance by poolng part of ther reserves nstead of holdng a large stock
of foregn reserves.
Snce t began, the CMI hasmade sgnﬁcant progress n expandng the sze of pooled
reserves and streamlnng the decson-makng procedure. Among a seres of eﬀorts
to strengthen the capacty of the CMI, the CMI multlateralsaton (CMIM) s the most
sgnﬁcant. The CMIM, whch came nto eﬀect n 2010, ntroduced a sngle contractual
agreement to govern all of the BSAs. It would enhance the transparency of swap
agreements and facltate the prompt and smultaneous actvaton of swaps by
establshng a collectve decson-makng procedure. The total fund sze that can be
moblzed through the actvaton of the swapswas ncreased substantally13. Compared
wth the prevous CMI, the CMIM s a more nclusve arrangement because all of the
ASEAN+3members partcpate and ﬁnancally contrbute to t.
Despte the sgnﬁcant progress of the CMI, Asan countres have faled to save the cost
of the balance-of-payments nsurance by reducng ther foregn reserves. In fact, snce
the Asan crss, the pace of reserve accumulaton has accelerated. It appears that the
CMI s not yet perceved as a serous alternatve to costly self-nsurance through
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12. The dscusson n ths secton s based on Knkyo (2013a, b).
13. The total fund sze was ncreased to US$120 bllon. In 2012, there was a new agreement to double the total fund
sze.
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reserve accumulaton. Furthermore, the CMI was not actvated durng the global
ﬁnancal crss of 2007-09. Although the Korean authortes arranged for and actvated
a swap agreement wth the US Federal Reserve durng the crss, they dd not seek to
actvate the CMI.
Asan countres are reluctant to actvate the CMI because of ts explct lnkage to the
Internatonal Monetary Fund programme. To fully actvate the swap, a borrowng
country needs to negotate an IMF programme14. However, Asan countres have a deep
dstrust of IMF programmes because of ther uncomfortable experence durng the
Asan ﬁnancal crss (Ito, 2007). Asa’s antpathy towards the IMF s a major obstacle
to the actvaton of the CMI.
In ths respect, Europe’s response to the recent economc crss provdes valuable
lessons. The IMFwas nvolved substantally n the balout of crss-aﬀected countres,
such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. European countres took the ntatve n crss
resoluton through close coordnaton between the Troika of the European Commsson,
the European Central Bank (ECB), and the IMF15.
Furthermore, the IMF works closely wth the European Stablty Mechansm (ESM),
whch was naugurated n October 2012. The ESM s a permanent balout fund
establshed by a treaty sgned by all the euro-area countres16. The ESM Board of
Governors s authorsed to make decsons on key ssues, such as the approval of
ﬁnancal assstance. The board s comprsed of the ﬁnancal mnsters of euro-area
countres, wth the European Commssoner for Economc and Monetary Aﬀars and
the Presdent of the ECBpartcpatng as observers. On behalf of theBoard of Governors,
the European Commsson wll work closely wth the IMF to assess rsks to ﬁnancal
stablty, analyse the sustanablty of debt, negotate adjustment programmes and
montor programme complance17. Therefore, although the IMF and ESMprovde loans
under dﬀerent terms, ther condtons and dsbursement are closely coordnated
(Psan-Ferry et al, 2013).
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14. Amnor porton of the swap can be actvated wthout the IMF programme. However, the remanng part requres an
agreement or near-agreement wth the IMF. The celng of the IMF non-lnked portonwas rased from10 percent to
20 percent n 2005 and there was a new agreement to rase t to 30 percent n 2012.
15. See Psan-Ferry et al (2013) for the detaled analyss of EU-IMF cooperaton n resolvng the European economc
crss.
16. For more detals of the ESM, see European Central Bank (2011).
17. More specﬁcally, aMemorandumof Understandng (MOU) that specﬁes the condtonalty attached to the loan s
negotated by the European Commsson n lason wth the ECB and the IMF, and debt stablty analyss s jontly
conducted by the Commsson and the IMF. A euro-areamember country requestng ﬁnancal assstance from the
ESM s expected to address, wherever possble, a smlar request to the IMF (IMF, 2013, p.38).
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The coordnaton between the CMI and the IMF should be strengthened to avod
duplcaton and to establsh amore eﬃcent dvson of labour. Specﬁcally, Asa should
consder establshng a regonal ﬁnancal arrangement modelled on the ESM, whch
wll provde ﬁnancal assstance n close collaboratonwth the IMF. Under the exstng
CMI framework, Asa delegates the adjustment programmenegotaton to the IMF, and,
as dscussed above, the full actvaton of the swap s lnked passvely to the IMF
programme. Currently, there s no nsttutonal arrangement for the CMI member
representatves to be nvolved n the desgn of the programme.
By contrast, an EMS-type arrangement envsages an adjustment programme negot-
ated n close collaboraton wth the IMF. Such an arrangement could become an
alternatve to costly reserve accumulaton by establshng a well-desgned co-
ordnaton mechansm wth the IMF, whch would enhance Asa’s ownershp of
adjustment programmes and reduce antpathy towards the IMF.
Another key lesson that Asa can learn from the European economc crss s the
mportance of eﬀectve economc survellance for crss preventon. The crss had ts
orgns n the buld-up of ﬁnancal, ﬁscal and economc mbalances n the euro area
(OECD, 2012). In partcular, the wdenng of current-account mbalances rendered the
euro-area countres vulnerable to ﬁnancal contagon. The vulnerablteswere created
because current-account mbalances were assocated wth unsustanable credt
booms n the deﬁct countres, whchwere ﬁnanced by cheap but volatle captal ﬂows
from the surplus countres. See Clne andWolﬀ (2012) formore detaled analyss of the
causes of the European economc crss.
The crss could have been prevented f the sources of such mbalances had been
dentﬁed through the survellance, and necessary polcy adjustments, such as the
rebalancng of ﬁscal polcy and tghtenng of macroprudental regulatons, had been
made. The need for eﬀectve survellance should be even greater n Asa, whch smore
susceptble to asymmetrc shocks because of the heterogenety of the regon’s
economes. After the Asan crss, the ASEAN+3 countres ntroduced a regonal
survellancemechansm known as the Economc Revew and Polcy Dalogue (EPRD).
In 2011, the EPRD process was renforced by the establshment of an ndependent
survellance unt (ASEAN+3 Macroeconomc Research Oﬃce: AMRO) n Sngapore.
Asa should strengthen ts cooperaton wth the IMF to enhance the eﬀectveness of
regonal economc survellance. For example, AMRO oﬃcals should be allowed to
partcpate n the IMF’s Artcle IV consultatonmssons to the ASEAN+3members. Ths
s mportant to establsh the foundaton for closer collaboraton n crss resoluton,
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whch s a prerequste for the creaton and successful operaton of an ESM-type
arrangement.
Moreover, the EU and Japan should work together to encourage AMRO and ESM to
strengthen ther operatonal cooperaton. To begnwth, AMROand ESMcanhold regular
meetngs to exchange vews and share experence on survellance and crss
management. A regular daloguewll help both nsttutons to dentfy best practces for
ther operatons. Over the long run, the two nsttutons should consder developng an
nsttutonal framework for coordnatng ther crssmanagement operatons. The recent
global ﬁnancal crss has demonstrated that ﬁnancal shocks can be transmtted
rapdly across regons. Wth a greater rsk of ﬁnancal contagon, there s a growng
need for strengthened cooperaton between regonal ﬁnancal arrangements, and
between regonal and multlateral arrangements. AMRO and ESM can set a precedent
for eﬀectve nter-regonal cooperaton on crss management.
4. Conclusions
East Asa has recently wtnessed a rapd ncrease n ntra-regonal trade, especally n
ntermedate goods. Ths reﬂects the spread of vertcally-ntegrated supply chans
wthn the regon. An FTA can contrbute to further trade ntegraton n East Asa. In
partcular, a regon-wde FTA, notably the RCEP, wll facltate the spread of regonal
supply chans and therefore enhance the productvty of Factory Asa.
By comparson, Asa’s ntegraton through cross-border ﬁnancal transactons,
partcularly portfolo nvestment, s laggng. Although ASEAN member countres seek
to promote the development of ntegrated captalmarkets, there are large nter-country
gaps n the regulatory capacty and market nfrastructures, hnderng further
ntegraton.
East Asa’s economc ntegraton has been a key drvng force for the regon’s rapd
ndustralsaton and growth, fromwhch both EU and Japan have greatly beneﬁtted. To
further promote trade and ﬁnancal ntegraton n East Asa, the EU and Japan should
strengthen economc cooperaton. More specﬁcally, eﬀorts should be made n the
followng areas.
• The EU and Japan should make as much eﬀort as possble to reach a hgh-qualty
trade agreement both n terms of scope and depth, that provdes a useful
benchmark for the RCEP and other subsequent FTAs.
EUROPE AND JAPAN: TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
33
1893 Blueprint XXII 3/4/14 12:07 Page 33
• The EU and Japan should collaborate to take a leadng role n coordnatng techncal
assstance for the ASEAN captal market development and n ﬁllng the gap n
fundng resources.
• The EU and Japan should work together to encourage AMRO and ESM to strengthen
ther cooperaton on survellance and crss management operatons.
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Trade and ﬁnancial linkages
between Europe and Japan:
new evidence and scope for
improvement
mICHAEl G. PlUmmER
Japan and the European Unon face major challenges n the emergng nternatonal
marketplace of the twenty-ﬁrst century, but there are also sgnﬁcant opportuntes.
The EU and Japan have common prortes n the economc reform process, from
structural reforms n agrculture and labour markets to debt reducton. The
contrbutons fromAndré Sapr and Takuj Knkyo gve an extensve revew of EU-Japan
trade and nvestment lnks, notng that the relatonshp contnues to be strong, even
though the shft n economc gravty towards Asa has had an mportant eﬀect on trade
and nvestment ﬂows n favour of that part of the world, especally Chna. The rsng
role of regonal producton networks and value chans n drvng economc ntegraton
s underscored n both contrbutons and s clear from the data analyss. Sapr and
Knkyo n ther contrbutonsmake the case that strengthenng the EU-Japan economc
partnershp should be an mportant polcy prorty to enhance compettveness and
facltate structural adjustment, ncludng formalmodes of cooperaton such as an EU-
Japan free-trade area (FTA).
I would lke to focus on the mplcatons of the regonalsm trend n the Asa-Pacﬁc for
both the EU and Japan, somewhat deepenng the dscusson on FTAs n Asa broached
by the Knkyo contrbuton. In partcular, I consder the mplcatons of the mega-
regonalsm movement n the Asa-Pacﬁc regon for Japan, the EU and the EU-Japan
economc relatonshp.
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Japan and mega-regionalism
The ‘Asan noodle bowl’ of crss-crossng FTAs n the Asa-Pacﬁc regon s well-known
and s well-documented by the Knkyo chapter. As he notes, whle Asan regonalsm
s complcated, n large part t has been drven by the need to support regonal
producton networks. However, blateral FTAs wll always fall short n supportng
regional producton networks. Hence, a regonal approach to economc cooperaton s
partcularly mportant n the Asan context.
The Trans-Pacﬁc Partnershp (TPP) n ts current negotatng format began n 2008 and
recently completed ts twenteth round of negotatons. It hasmssed several deadlnes
to ﬁnsh up and the current goal s to sgn an accord durng 2014, though ths wll be
dﬃcult for a varety of reasons, not least of whch md-term electons n the Unted
States. The TPP s beng desgned as a ‘twenty-ﬁrst century’ FTA andwould nclude: (1)
elmnaton of most tarﬀs and non-tarﬀ barrers; (2) new trade ssues such as those
created by electronc commerce, the fragmentaton of producton n modern supply
chans and the rse of state-owned enterprses; (3) reachng behnd the border tomake
regulatonsmore transparent and easer to navgate, ncludng by smaller enterprses.
The Regonal Comprehensve Economc Partnershp (RCEP) s a much more recent
ntatve; t was establshed n November 2012 and held ts thrd round of negotatons
n January 2014.Whle t s not yet clear howcomprehensve RCEPwll be, t wll nclude
manyof the chapters that are beng tackled n the TPP butwll allow formore ‘ﬂexblty’,
partcularly n terms of specal and preferental treatment for lower-ncomeeconomes.
Japan s an actve partcpant n the emergngmega-regonalsmmovement n the Asa-
Pacﬁc. Japan s the latest party to jon the TPP negotatons (July 2013) but s a
foundng member of RCEP. In the modellng work that I have done wth my colleagues
Peter Petr and Fan Zha18, we use a Computable General Equlbrum (CGE) model to
estmate the potental eﬀects of the TPP andRCEP tracks on economcwelfare, exports
and structural change of Japan, other partcpatng countres and non-members. The
gans to Japan are large (Table 1): by 2025 we estmate that the TPP and RCEP wll
generate gans of $105 bllon and $96 bllon, respectvely, or approxmately two
percent of Japanese GDP, relatve to the baselne. The reasons for these gans nclude
the fact that, f the TPP ndeed becomes the hgh qualty accord that t s purported to
be, t wll enable Japan to attract new foregn nvestment and to ncrease exports by 11
percent, wth an emphass on sophstcated manufactured products and servces. It
would ncrease Japanese productvty, especally n servces. Even n agrculture, t
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would open up new opportuntes n both domestc and foregn markets. The same
story generally holds for RCEP.
Table 1: Welfare effects of the TPP and RCEP
2025 2025 Change from baseline:
Baseline (US$b) Percent
GdP TPP12 fTAAP RCEP TPP12 fTAAP RCEP
Americas 24,867 101.7 452.3 2.5 0.4 1.8 0.0
Unted States 20,273 76.6 328.2 -0.1 0.4 1.6 0.0
Asia 34,901 125.2 1653.4 627.0 0.4 4.7 1.8
Chna 17,249 -34.8 837.1 249.7 -0.2 4.9 1.4
Japan 5,338 104.6 233.1 95.8 2.0 4.4 1.8
Others 41,820 -14.1 213.4 -6.8 0.0 0.5 0.0
Europe 22,714 -3.7 -40.9 5.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0
WORLD 103,223 223.4 2358.5 644.4 0.2 2.3 0.6
Memorandum
TPP12 33,045 285.0 878.6 155.1 0.9 2.7 0.5
RCEP 35,290 137.4 1490.2 617.9 0.4 4.2 1.8
Source: Petr, Plummer and Zha (www.asapacﬁctrade.org).
Moreover, should the RCEP and TPP merge nto a ‘Free-Trade Area of the Asa-Pacﬁc’
(FTAAP), whch s the ambtous trade-related goal of the Asa-Pacﬁc Economc
Cooperaton (APEC) organsaton, Japan’s welfare ganswould ncrease to $233 bllon
(four percent of GDP), only somewhat more than the combned eﬀects of RCEP and
TPP separately. Hence, n Asa-Pacﬁc cooperaton, Japanwould get the largemajorty
of ts gans va the two tracks n whch t s currently engaged.
Japan’s membershp of the TPP wll have postve global eﬀects too. The expanson of
the TPP hghlghts a remarkable compettve process: the agreement startedwth only
four small countres (Brune, Chle, New Zealand and Sngapore) but has snce grown
to eght, nne, eleven and now 12 countres, wth South Korea already n prelmnary
negotatons about possbly jonng and the Phlppnes, Thaland and Indonesa
suggestng possble membershp n the future. Moreover, the TPP has lkely prodded
not only the RCEP but also the proposed EU-Japan accord and the EU-US Trans-Pacﬁc
Trade and Investment Partnershp (TTIP).
Of course, the above gans accrue from structural change n favour of eﬃcency, and
neﬃcent sectors n Japan wll contract to some extent. Agrculture s the greatest
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concern n Japan, because of ts poltcal senstvty. Stll, agrculture s now just one
percent of the Japanese economy, and frankly, the degree to whch t would contract
s often exaggerated. Further, studes by the Organsaton for Economc Cooperaton
and Development, as well as our results, show many opportuntes for compettve
agrculture, n hgh-value fruts and vegetables, organc products, toursm and so on.
We also antcpate that Japan wll be able to keep some of ts most senstve barrers
and, n the end, project onlymld, gradual declnes for the agrculture sector as awhole.
The large beneﬁts elsewhere n the economywould allow generous compensaton for
people whomght be harmed n ths transton.
So Japanmght envson the TPP to embrace a broad strategy that also supports RCEP
and trade negotatonswth Chna, Korea and the EU. Ideally, Japanwll promote smlar,
hgh qualty rules n all negotatons, helpng to buld a consstent, rules-based tradng
system.
Implications for the EU
The eﬀects of mega-regonalsm n the Asa-Pacﬁc wll lkely be small for the EU, n
large part because the process wll be ‘open’ and the partcpatng countres already
have relatvely low trade barrers, leavng less potental for trade and nvestment
dverson. Indeed, our estmates suggest that the EU wll only bear a $4 bllon trade
dverson eﬀect from the TPP and actually a net gan from RCEP, due to growth and
terms-of-trade eﬀects. An FTAAP would create a large trade dverson eﬀect of $41
bllon, four tmes that of the TPP but only two-tenths of one percent of EU GDP.
Moreover, EU members would gan from a more stable and prosperous Asan regon,
where approxmately two-thrds of the world’s poor lve.
Stll, wewould suggest that EU does have a strong ncentve to lnkwth thsmovement
for a number of reasons19. Frst, whle trade dverson n the aggregate wll be small,
the eﬀects could be substantal at the product level (Plummer 2014). Second, the
standards beng establshed especally n the context of the TPP could become global
standards; n fact, t would seem that ths s a salent goal of the negotators. It would
be n the EU’s strategc nterest to be a partcpant n these dscussons. For example,
the EUwas actvely nvolved n craftng the Ant-Counterfetng Trade Agreement (ACTA)
but as t was vetoed by the European Parlament n 2012, the ntellectual-property
chapter of the TPP could well emerge as the ndustry standard. In addton, n the
context ofmega-regonalsm, EUﬁrmsactve n Asawll be able to proﬁt fromenhanced
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eﬃcences, and new exportsmarkets can be exploted. But the gans would certanly
not be as great as they would f the EU was nvolved n the process; the EU would gan
more from lberalsaton at the multlateral level. The EU can (and s) negotatng
accords wth major partcpants n these processes, but these are generally blateral
accords; some of the bggest gans from the Asan and Transpacﬁc tracks derve from
the ablty of these regons to consoldate ther many blateral FTAs, thereby reducng
the costs assocatedwth rules of orgn and ncreasng utlsaton rates of commercal
preferences nherent n the accords. The EUwll not be able to do ths, unless, of course,
t pushed for an ntatve at the Asa-Europe Meetng (ASEM), but that would take a
sea-change n the drecton of that organsaton. Moreover, the Asa-Pacﬁc regon s
the largest and most dynamc regon n the world: remanng outsde the ntegraton
process wll be costly not only n terms of potental economc dscrmnaton but also
ts ablty to gude global commercal polcy.
Concluding remarks
The chapters by André Sapr and Takuj Knkyomake strong mplct and explct cases
for an EU-Japan FTA; our analyss suggests that the EU has a strong nterest n the
process of regonal economc ntegraton n the Asa-Pacﬁc regon and would do well
to connect wth t to the greatest extent possble. An EU-Japan FTA (aswell as the TTIP)
would be an mportant step n ths drecton.
However, t s mportant to note that mega-regonalsm needs to be well-nested n the
World Trade Organsaton context and drected n such a way that t supports global
rules and ntegraton rather than regonal ones. The EU and Japan, aswell as theUnted
States and the rest of the global communty, should keep ths nmnd as theynegotate
these mega-agreements.
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Part 2:
Housing bubbles, government
responses and
economic/corporate
adjustments: can Europe
learn from Japan?
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Japaniﬁcation or salvation
JOACHIm fElS
Isn’t t ronc? Just as Japan, thanks to aggressvemonetary andﬁscal polces, s about
to ext deﬂaton at long last, the euro area rsks fallng nto a deﬂatonary trap smlar
to that whch Japan experenced n the 1990s and 2000s. Back then, Japan suﬀered
from a prolonged post-bubble balance sheet recesson, a late and overly cautous
monetary polcy response, perodc strong currency apprecaton, a falure to enforce
a rapd clean-up of bank balance sheets, a premature ﬁscal tghtenng n 1997 that
pushed the economy back nto recesson and a general nsttutonal reform scleross.
Sounds famlar?
Of course, the euro area s not Japan and hstory doesn’t repeat tself. But there are
echoes, and gven the many parallels, a Japanﬁcaton of the euro area s a serous
rsk. I beleve that Japanﬁcaton can stll be avoded f euro-area polcymakers heed
three lessons from Japan: ) Monetary polcy should move early and aggressvely
before deﬂaton manfests tself; ) Regulators should enforce a clean-up of bank
balance sheets, ncludng a realstc assessment of bad assets and swft
recaptalsaton where needed; and ) Governments should avod overly tght ﬁscal
polces that could plunge economes back nto recesson.
The Japan narrative
The story of Japan’s two lost decades has been toldmany tmes, so t suﬃces to recap
the key elements breﬂy.
The prelude to the lost decades was the three Bs: a boom that begot a bubble that
ended n a bust. Easy monetary polcy and strong growth n the second half of the
1980s fuelled a debt-ﬁnanced equty- and land-prce bubble, whch burst n the early
1990s after the Bank of Japan tghtened polcy sharply.
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What followed can be summarsed as the three Ds: deleveragng, deﬂaton and debt.
The collapse n equty and land prces pushed many ﬁrms and households nto
negatve equty and nduced them to pay down debt.
• Deleveragng depressed demand, resultng n what Rchard Koo has called a
balance-sheet recesson. A seres of ﬁscal stmulus packages by the government
helped to mtgate the mpact of prvate-sector balance-sheet contracton on
demand, makng the recesson more shallow and even supportng occasonal
recoveres.
• Deﬂaton set n only several years after the bubble burst. In my vew, t largely
resulted from a combnaton of delayed balance-sheet clean-up n the bankng
sector and a slow response by the Bank of Japan to the balance-sheet recesson n
the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, whch was partly explaned by the fear of pumpng up
yet another bubble. By the tme the Bank of Japan ﬁnally cut oﬃcal rates to the
zero bound (1998), deﬂaton had already set n so that real nterest rates never
went negatve.
• Publc sector debt rose sharply, partly as a consequence of themanyﬁscal stmulus
packages, and partly as a consequence of deﬂaton, whch resulted n fallng
nomnal ncomes and tax recepts.
Fnally, another mportant element of the Japan narratve s the CRIC cycle – the cycle
of crss, response, mprovement and complacency – whch my colleague Robert
Feldman coned and descrbed as early as 2001 to explan Japan’s nsttutonal reform
scleross. The cycle arses from the nteracton of two natural tendences: ) The
economy responds slowly to polcy reforms; and ) Polcymakers tend to slow the
reform process as the economy mproves. Each economc crss durng the lost
decades sparked a polcy response, but the subsequent economc and market
mprovements led to complacency on the part of polcymakers, whch n turn paved the
way for the next crss.
How Japanese is the euro area?
The Japan narratve s certanly not a blueprnt for the euro area. There are some
mportant dﬀerences, but there are also many parallels. Here s my lst of the man
smlartes and dﬀerences:
• Lke n Japan, a cycle of boom, bubble and bust was at the orgn of the euro area’s
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current problems. A sharp declne n real nterest rates and strong growth n the
perpheral countres followng the ntroducton of the euro led to debt-ﬁnanced asset
prce booms and bubbles, whch eventually burst n the late 2000s.
• Yet,much of the booms and bubbles n the perpherywas ﬁnanced by lenders from
the core, who quckly wthdrew ther captal when the bubble burst. Thus, the
burstng asset bubble and the resultng bankng sector problems turned nto an
ntra-euro area balance-of-payments crss, whch led to doubts about the vablty
of the sngle currency. In ths sense, the euro-area crss wasmuch worse than the
Japanese crss.
• In addton, markets soon realsed that the euro-area member states were not true
soveregns as they were ndebted n a currency they could not prnt themselves.
Thus, markets refused to fund governments at reasonable nterest rates and a
soveregn debt crss resulted. Therefore, contrary to Japan, the euro-area countres
most aﬀected by the crss lost ther ablty to pursue countercyclcal ﬁscal polces
and nstead had to tghten polcy nto the downturn, thus aggravatng the recesson.
By contrast, Japan was able to mtgate the consequences of the balance-sheet
recesson n the prvate sector through expansonary ﬁscal polcy. And when the
government decded to rase the consumpton tax n 1997 after an economc
recovery n 1995-96, t soon turned out to be a mstake because t pushed the
economy back nto recesson.
• Another mportant parallel between Japan back then and the euro area today s the
slowprogressmade n cleanng up bank balance sheets and recaptalsng ﬁnancal
nsttutons. As a consequence, both Japan and the euro area wtnessed (and the
latter s stll wtnessng) a contracton of credt volumes and weak broad money
growth. The European Central Bank’s master plan s to acheve the balance sheet
clean-up and recaptalsaton n the run-up to bankng unon. If successful, ths could
be an mportant catalyst for reparng the credtmechansm. Yet,muchwork remans
to be done, and n themeantme, bank deleveragngwth ts potentally deﬂatonary
consequences wll lkely contnue.
• Untl recently, the ECBwas able to prevent deﬂaton and keep nﬂaton expectatons
anchored around ts deﬁnton of prce stablty (below but close to 2 percent).
Arguably, ths has been due to the farly aggressve early response snce the onset
of the crss n 2007-08, when the ECB started to engage n varous forms of
unconventonal easng. However, note that deﬂaton only took hold n Japan about
eght years nto the balance-sheet recesson – thus t s too early for the euro area
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to rejoce, n my vew. The rsk of deﬂaton n the euro area has ncreased recently.
Why? Frst, credt keeps contractng as bank deleveragng contnues or even
accelerates ahead of 2014’s asset qualty revew and stress test. Second, wages n
several crss countres such as Span are now startng to fall as a lagged conse-
quence of hgh unemployment and past labour-market reforms. Thrd, the euro has
apprecated further n response to the Fed’s change-of-mnd on taperng.Meanwhle,
current nﬂaton s already runnng sgnﬁcantly below target and looks set to drop
further ths month. But so far, the ECB has stubbornly refused to acknowledge
deﬂatonary rsks,much lke theBank of Japan before the onset of Japan’s deﬂaton.
Japaniﬁcation can still be avoided
Taken together, a Japanﬁcaton of the euro area s a serous rsk. But I beleve that
Japanﬁcaton can stll be avoded f euro-area polcymakers heed three lessons from
Japan: ) Monetary polcy should move early and aggressvely before deﬂaton
manfests tself; ) Regulators should enforce a clean-up of bank balance sheets
ncludng a realstc assessment of bad assets and a swft recaptalsaton where
needed; and ) Governments should avod overly tght ﬁscal polces that could plunge
economes back nto recesson. I thnk there s a better-than-even chance that these
lessons wll be heeded and the euro area’s Japanﬁcaton can be avoded. But I’m
nervous.
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land price bubbles, government
responses and
economic/corporate
adjustment in Japan
TOmOmI mIYAZAkI
1. Introduction
Japan has experenced the long stagnaton of the so-called ‘lost two decades’ snce
the early 1990s. Although someeconomc ndcators show sgns of recovery, t seems
not to be a full-ﬂedged recovery from Japan’s long recesson. Japan’s long stagnaton
was attrbuted to polcy falures from the late 1980s to the early 1990s that fueled the
so-called ‘bubble’ economy. Asset prces rose drastcally n the late1980s. However, as
many prevous studes such as Okna et al (2001), Okna and Shratsuka (2002) and
Asako (2012) argue, the sharp rse n asset prces was a bubble that dd not
necessarly reﬂect market fundamentals. Needless to say, bubble cannot persst
ndeﬁntely. In the early 1990s, asset prces were fallng. As a result, the Japanese
economy was depressed. To stmulate the economy, the Bank of Japan and the
Japanese government followed expansonary monetary and ﬁscal polces. The
Japanese government put n place large ﬁscal stmulus packages almost every year
n the 1990s. However, many emprcal studes, such as Ihor et al (2003), Nakazato
and Konsh (2004), Fuj (2008), Eguch and Hraga (2009) and Myazak (2010),
show that the ﬁscal polces of the 1990s were not eﬀectve. Some studes ﬁnd that
ﬁscal expanson reduced prvate demand, especally corporate sector nvestment.
However, the ﬁscal polcy response n the post-bubble perodwas a partal cause of the
ensung publc ﬁnancal deteroraton.
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In ths chapter, we summarse themovement of the Japanese economy from themd-
1980s to the early 1990s and the ﬁscal polcy response after the bubble perods. Frst,
we depct the emergence and subsequent burstng of the land-prce bubble n the late
1980s by analysng the economc polcy durng ths perod. We also descrbe what
happened to corporate nvestment after the collapse of bubble20. Second, we analyse
the ﬁscal polcy and corporate response n the post-bubble perod by presentng earler
works on eﬀectveness of ﬁscal polcy n Japan. Here we focus on the studes that
examned the eﬀects on corporate nvestment.
In secton 2, we summarse themovement of the ‘bubble’ n themd-1980s to the early
1990s n Japan. Secton 3 presents the ﬁscal polcy response after the bubble perod
and some earler works on ﬁscal polcy eﬀectveness n these perods. Secton 4
concludes.
2. The creation and bursting of the bubble in the late 1980s in Japan21
2.1. The creation of the bubble in the latter half of the 1980s
The late 1980s to the early 1990s are called a bubble perod, and correctly so n terms
of land prces. As Fgure 1 shows, land prces n ths perod were the hghest n two
decades, httng a celng n 199122. Accordng to the Economc Survey of Japan,
conducted n 1988 and 1989, the gap between actual and theoretcal land prces was
partcularly large n the years 1986-89. Thsmeans that land prces n ths perodwere
too hgh relatve to the level mpled by market fundamentals, and ths suggests that
the hgh prce of landwas the result of a bubble23. As shown n Ish (2008), commercal
land prces n Tokyo soared and ths spread to the resdental prce n Tokyo. After that,
land prces n both Osaka and Nagoya began to rse, and rsng prces propagated
natonwde.
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20. The asset prce bubble around the late 1980s also had an aspect as a stock prce bubble. However, to be consstent
wth the theme of ths volume, our arguments focus on housng and land prces. Moreover, we only depct the
movement of land prces n ths chapter because the bubble economy around the late 1980s was caused by the
land prces rather than housng prces.
21. Most of the arguments n ths secton are ndebted to Asako (2000) and Asako (2012).
22. The data of land prce n Fgure 1 s oﬃcal land prce data provded by Mnstry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Toursm. Although ths data does not necessarly reﬂect actual market prces traded n the market, we have
nothng but to use ths data. Ths s why there seems to be no other good ndcator of the land prce that reﬂects the
actual market prce properly. Pay attenton to ths pont.
23. For more detals, please see Asako (2012).
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Figure 1: Land price movement in Japan (national average)
Source: http://www.chka-data.com/.
One possble cause of the land prce bubble was the Bank of Japan’s expansonary
monetary polcy. The oﬃcal dscount rate, whch the Bank of Japan used as a polcy
nterest rate untl 1993, was cut ﬁve tmes begnnng n January 198624. The Bank of
Japan cut the oﬃcal dscount rate n order to deal wth an economc slump. The Plaza
Accord and the resultng apprecaton of the yen hurt Japanese exports, causng the
slump. From February 1987 to May 1989, the oﬃcal dscount rate remaned at 2.5
percent, the then-lowest rate snce the foundng of the Bank of Japan (Fgure 2).
Whle the monetary loosenng polcy was ntended to devalue the yen, t caused
excess lqudty – n other words, an unusual supply of lqudty to the market.
Moreover, the accumulaton of the net foregn wealth thanks to the current account
surplus n these perods also accelerated the supply of lqudty. The excess lqudty
caused a rse n asset prces and as a result land prces ncreased (Fgure 1)25.
Themonetary loosenng polcy and the ncrease n land prces contrbuted to the credt
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24. The oﬃcal dscount rate s the nterest rate used when the central bank lends money to the commercal bank.
25. There are some channels va whch the excess lqudty nﬂuences the asset prces. For ths pont, see Adald and
Detken (2007).
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26. Moreover, Hattor et al (2009) pont out that another cause of the credt expanson was the deregulaton n the
captal markets that relaxed exstng restrctons on bond ssues and by the ntroducton of tme deposts wth
lberalsed nterest rates.
expanson26. Incdentally, when nvestors or companes borrowed money, land and
other real estate was often used as collateral n Japan. Ths reﬂects the ‘land myth’
that land prces would contnue to rse. There s no doubt that the hgher the prce of
land, the more attractve land became as collateral. As a result, ﬁnancal nsttutons
held large volumes of loans secured wth land.
2.2. The bursting of the bubble and the corporate response
The ncrease n asset prces spread to the real economy, and the Japanese economy
enjoyed prosperty. However, both the Japanese government and the Bank of Japan
were concerned about the asset prce bubbles. Thus, they adopted some austerty
measures.
Frst, the Bank of Japan rased the oﬃcal dscount rate startng n May 1989. The
oﬃcal dscount rate reached 6.0 percent n September 1990. However, the ncrease
n land prces dd not stop at that pont: even f the polcy nterest ratewas rased, there
may have been a tme lag before ts eﬀects spread.
Figure 2: Official discount rate (January 1985-December 1995)
Source: Nkke NEEDS Database.
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
01
/8
5
06
/8
5
11
/8
5
04
/8
6
09
/8
6
02
/8
7
07
/8
7
12
/8
7
05
/8
8
10
/8
8
03
/8
9
08
/8
9
01
/9
0
06
/9
0
11
/9
0
04
/9
1
09
/9
1
02
/9
2
07
/9
2
12
/9
2
05
/9
3
10
/9
3
03
/9
4
08
/9
4
01
/9
5
06
/9
5
11
/9
5
1893 Blueprint XXII 3/4/14 12:07 Page 52
Second, the government ntroduced quanttatve restrctons on real estate lendng n
March 1990. Although ths polcy was done to suppress the ncrease n land prces, t
was so radcal that the Japanese economy worsened. Asako (2012) ponts out that
ths polcy was a turnng pont towards a drop n land prces.
Thrd, the government announced a seres of reforms to the land-tax system, such as
the ntroducton of a land-value tax27.
Fnally, the government expanded the desgnaton of dstrcts subject to land-prce
montorng. As a consequence of these tghtenng polces, the bubble burst, and land
prces fell drastcally n 1992 (Fgure 1).
The drop n land prces led to concerns about credt at ﬁnancal nsttutons, whch held
large volumes of loans secured aganst land. The drop n land prces caused a problem
of bad or non-performng loans. Moreover, the negatve wealth eﬀect caused by the
sharp fall n land prces reduced prvate demand.
Fgure 3 shows the trend n corporate nvestment (ncludng constructon n progress)
from 1980 to 2000. Ths ﬁgure tells us that the drop n corporate nvestment after the
burstng of the bubble concded wth the drop n land prces. Moreover, the drop s
promnent n the constructon and real estate ndustres, for whch land plays an
mportant role. There are three reasons for the drop-oﬀ n corporate nvestment. Frst,
t was a reacton to the over-nvestment durng the bubble perod. Second, ﬁnancal
nsttutonswere reluctant to lendmoney to companes for varous reasons. Thrd, the
companes themselves had to cut ther nvestments because of the negatve wealth
eﬀect mentoned above.
3. The ﬁscal policy response
In the post-bubble perod, both the Bank of Japan and the government conducted an
expansonary monetary and ﬁscal polcy n order to support the economy. In ths
secton, we ﬁrst summarse the expansonary ﬁscal polcy of the 1990s. Second, we
dscuss some earler studes on ﬁscal polcy eﬀectveness n these perods n Japan.
We especally dscuss the eﬀects of publc nvestment on corporate nvestment
(prvate nvestment).
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27. Incdentally, Ish (2008) ponts out that poltcal posturng prevented the land-value tax from beng eﬀectve to
suppress land prces.
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28. The Japanese government ssues specal deﬁct-ﬁnancng bonds to ﬁnance a deﬁct for non-nvestment purposes
by enactng a law eﬀectve for only one year (see Do and Ihor, 2009).
29. Moreover, the local governmentswere also nvolved n the n stablsaton eﬀorts ntated by the central government
through ther nvestments, as shown nHana et al (2000), Pascha andRobaschk (2001), Do and Ihor (2009) and
Myazak (2009). Snce local governments also ncreased ther nvestment by ssung the constructon bonds of
prefectures or muncpaltes, the local government debt outstandng had rapdly ncreased shortly after the
collapse of the bubble.
The Japanese government mplemented many stmulus packages as supplemental
budgets throughout the 1990s, as shown n Table 1. Although ncomeand corporate tax
reductons and ﬁnancal assstance to small and medum enterprses (SMEs) were
ncluded, stmulus packages manly nvolved publc nvestment, partcularly n
nfrastructure. Ths made up most of the supplemental budget planned as a stmulus
package n August 1992, Aprl 1993, September 1993 and September 1995.
One reason for ths s that whereas the Publc Fnance Act prohbts the ssue of deﬁct
bonds n prncple, the Act allows lmted bond ssuance n the General Account (the
Japanese central government’s budget) to rase funds to ﬁnance publc nvestment,
equty nvestment and loans to publc corporatons28. Reﬂectng ths, constructon
bonds formedmost of the Japanese central government’s bond ssuance n the 1990s,
as shown by Fgure 429.
Figure 3: Corporate investment (% change from previous year)
Source: Cabnet Oﬃce of Japan.
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The other reason s that publc nvestment n Japan has an aspect of pork-barrel
spendng, as shown by Kondoh (2008) and Do and Ihor (2009). That s, snce publc
nvestment n Japan can be used to support local regons, poltcal pressure from local
nterest groupsmght ncrease the sze of publc nvestment and the rural areasmght
share most of t. In fact, whle the sze of publc nvestment ncreased n the 1990s,
therewas relatvelymore publc nvestment n rural areas than n urban areas such as
Kanto, Toka andKansa, n the1990s (Fgure 5). Ths suggests that althoughnumerous
publc nvestment programmeswere mplemented as ﬁscal stmulus packages, most
of themwere allocated to rural areas.
Table 1: Chronology of economic stimulus packages and tax cuts in the 1990s
Stimulus packages Tax cuts
date of announcement date of announcement date of implementation
August 1992
Aprl 1993 Aprl 1993 December 1993 & June 1994
September 1993
February 1994 February 1994 July 1994 & December 1994
September 1994 January 1995, June1995,
& December 1995
Aprl 1995 December 1995 June 1996 & December 1996
September 1995
December 1997 February 1998, June 1998,
December 1998, and June 1999
Aprl 1998 Aprl 1998 August 1998
November 1998
November 1999
Source: Myazak (2010).
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Figure 4: The size of outstanding Japanese central government bonds (left scale),
and ratio to GDP (%, right scale)
Source: Mnstry of Fnance.
Figure 5: Regional share of public investment in Japan
Source: Cabnet Oﬃce of Japan.
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However, publc nvestment has two asymmetrc eﬀects on corporate nvestment. One
eﬀect s crowdng-n, that s, the ncrease n publc nvestment stmulates corporate
nvestment. The other eﬀect s crowdng-out. If ths s the case, publc nvestment
reduces corporate nvestment. Accordng to Kozuka et al (2012), the crowdng-out
eﬀect was observed by most prevous Japanese emprcal studes such as Ihor et al
(2003), Nakazato andKonsh (2004), Fuj (2008) and Eguch andHraga (2009)30. In
partcular, ths s promnent n the studes that add the 1990s to the sample perods.
Moreover, Myazak (2010) examned the eﬀects of ﬁscal polcy n the 1990s n Japan
by usng a ‘narratve approach’. Ths enables us to examne polcy eﬀects usng a tme-
seresmethod n conjunctonwth an event study. Usng ths approach, we consder not
only the sze and persstence of each polcy change, but also the eﬀects of dﬀerent
ﬁscal polces n dﬀerent perods.
To dentfy polcy eﬀects, Myazak (2010) used dummy varables to capture polcy
changes, followng the chronology shown n Table 1. Fgures 6a to 6c show the mpulse
response functons of the shocks of economc stmulus packages wth respect to the
varables related to corporate nvestment per potental GDP (PGDP) byusng the results
of Myazak (2010)31. Fgure 6a shows the results of the 1990s stmulus packages
(‘ﬁscal’) wth respect to corporate nvestment per PGDP (‘p’). Ths ﬁgure tells us that
therewas a negatve response n terms of corporate nvestment to the ﬁscal expanson
throughout the 1990s. Fgure 6b shows the results by dvdng the nvestment nto
non-resdental nvestment per PGDP (non-r.nv) and resdental nvestment per PGDP
(r.nv). Although crowdng-out s observed n both cases, the negatve response n
terms of non-resdental nvestmentwas substantal. Fgure 6c shows the resultswhen
we dvde the perods of the announcement and mplementaton of the economc
stmulus packages nto the former half (ﬁscal 1) and latter half of the 1990s (ﬁscal
2). Although a negatve response was observed n all cases, only the response to the
packages n the latter half of the 1990s wth respect to non-resdental nvestment
was statstcally sgnﬁcant. The results of Myazak (2010) mply that the crowdng-
out eﬀect occurred n the 1990s especally for non-resdental nvestment, and ﬁscal
expanson n these perods was not eﬀectve n terms of stmulatng the corporate to
nvest.
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30. A recent paper by Fuj et al (2013) examned the crowdng n/out eﬀects of publc nvestment by usng sectoral
prvate nvestment data and shows the results that the eﬀects are dﬀerent dependng on the characterstcs of
ndustres.
31. Myazak (2010) shows the results of mpulse response functons by usng tables nstead of ﬁgures for the sake
of brevty. Detaled results are shown n Myazak (2010) and other ﬁgures can be obtaned from the author on
request.
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The crowdng-out eﬀect observed n Japanmght partly be attrbuted to the allocaton
of publc nvestment. As Fgure 5 shows, most publc nvestment mplemented as
stmulus packages n the 1990s n Japan was lkely to have been allocated to rural
areas. In general, the productvty of rural areas s low. In lne wth ths, the crowdng-
out eﬀect mght also be relevant as an ndcaton of the neﬃcency of nterregonal
allocaton, because publc nvestment allocated predomnantly to rural areas nstead
of urban areas does not contrbute to the promoton of an ncrease n corporate
nvestment but rather nhbts t.
Figure 6a: Impulse response function of Miyazaki (2010) (‘Case 1’ in Miyazaki,
2010)
Note: The ﬁgure dsplays the results on polcy shock ‘ﬁscal’, whch ndcates the perods of the announcement and
mplementaton of economc stmulus packages throughout the 1990s, wth respect to corporate sector’s
nvestment per potental GDP (‘p’). The upper lmt of each mpulse response functon s sxteenth quarters. The
sold lnes represent the mpulse response functons for a dummy varable for ﬁscal polcy. The dashed lnes
represent the 95 percent conﬁdence ntervals.
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Figure 6b: Impulse response function of Miyazaki (2010) (‘Case 2’ in Miyazaki,
2010)
Note: The ﬁgure dsplays the results on polcy shock ‘ﬁscal’, whch ndcates the perods of the announcement and
mplementaton of economc stmulus packages throughout the 1990s, wth respect to non-resdental nvestment
per potental GDP (‘non-r.nv’) and resdental nvestment per potental GDP (‘r.nv’). The upper lmt of each mpulse
response functon s sxteenth quarters. The sold lnes represent the mpulse response functons for a dummy
varable for ﬁscal polcy. The dashed lnes represent the 95 percent conﬁdence ntervals.
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Figure 6c: Impulse response function of Miyazaki (2010) (‘Case 4’ in Miyazaki,
2010)
Note: The ﬁgure dsplays the results on polcy shocks wth respect to non-resdental nvestment per potental GDP
(‘non-r.nv’) and resdental nvestment per potental GDP (‘r.nv’). ‘Fscal 1’ ndcates the perods of the
announcement and mplementaton of economc stmulus packages n the former half of the 1990s, and ‘ﬁscal 2’
dentﬁes the perods of the announcement and mplementaton of economc stmulus packages n the latter half of
the 1990s. The upper lmt of each mpulse response functon s sxteenth quarters. The sold lnes represent the
mpulse response functons for a dummy varable for ﬁscal polcy. The dashed lnes represent the 95 percent
conﬁdence ntervals.
4. Conclusion and main messages
In ths chapter, we ﬁrst dscussed the development and burstng of land-prce bubbles
n the late 1980s n Japan. Second, we presented the results of past research on
Japanese ﬁscal polcy durng the post-bubble perods. Prevous research showed that
the mpact of publc nvestmentwas not postve for corporate nvestment. Thus, ﬁscal
polcy n the 1990swas not necessarly adequate n terms of stmulatng the corporate
1893 Blueprint XXII 3/4/14 12:07 Page 60
sector’s ncentve to nvest. Moreover, because of the large stmulus packages
mplemented almost every year n the 1990s, the government’s ﬁnancal condton
worsened.Whereas the debt-to-GDP rato reached almost 140percent (Fgure 4), whch
s the hghest among developed countres, there s no doubt that one reason for ths
was the polcy response n the 1990s.
For polcymakers, there are two lessons from ths.
Frst, monetary loosenng polces can sometmes cause asset prce bubbles as
aﬃrmed by the experence of the late 1980s n Japan. In prncple, polcymakers
should not create bubbles, though bubbles sometmes emerge. Further, as Alan
Greenspan, former charman of the Federal Reserve Board, has sad, “we recognised
that, despite our suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until
after the fact – that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence”32. However,
polcymakers mght be requred to deal wth the bubble boom ‘gradually’ f they see
evdence of a bubble developng. The austertymeasures deployed n rapd sequence
n the early 1990s n Japan contrbuted to the burstng of the bubble. Polcymakers
should be careful not tomake the samemstake that the Japanese governmentmade.
Second, publc nvestment was frequently used as part of the stmulus packages
mplemented n many developed countres after the 2008 global ﬁnancal crss.
However, t has asymmetrc eﬀects on corporate nvestment. The Japanese case tells
us that the crowdng-out eﬀect s strong. Governments should carefully plan polcy
based on the movement of publc and prvate nvestment n dscussng the contents
of stmulus packages. One suggeston s that the government should nvest heavly n
urban areas or ndustres wth hgh future growth potental, unlke the Japanese case,
as dscussed n secton 3. In terms of both achevng economc growth and stablsng
themacroeconomy, the government should use ts budget for urban area or for sectors
that are expected to grow, even when publc nvestment s planned as a part of
economc stmulus packages.
This chapter is based on my presentation at the congress ‘Japan and the EU in the
global economy: challenges and opportunities’, held on 7 October 2013. I would
particularly like to thank GuntramWolff for valuable comments and suggestions. The
comments from Joachim Fels, Shigeto Kitano, Masafumi Kozuka, Kiyohiko G.
Nishimura andMichael G. Plummerwere also very useful to polish the paper. Thiswork
was financially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Young Scientist)
and financial aid from the Zengin Foundation. The usual disclaimer applies.
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32. See the webpage http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20020830/.
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When central bank
independence is challenged by
unconventional monetary
policies
WATARU TAkAHASHI
Summary33, 34
In the aftermath of the global ﬁnancal crss, a number of major central banks have
mplemented unconventonal monetary polces (UMPs). Ths paper dscusses
problems related to UMPs from the perspectve of central bank ndependence, whch
s beng challenged n both practce and theory. As many central banks are now
requred to pursue three types of stablty – prce, ﬁnancal and ﬁscal – there are areas
of potental conﬂct wth governments. In addton, the lack of a polcy rule for UMPs
erodes accountablty. The theory of central bank ndependence, whchwas desgned
to control nﬂaton, should therefore be revewed. I propose a new approach to central
bank ndependence from the vewpont of poltcal economy.
67
33. Ths chapter s based onmy presentaton ttled ‘Common Issues Central Banks Face on Unconventonal Monetary
Polces’ at the symposum on Japan and the EU in the global economy: challenges and opportunities, held by
Bruegel, Kobe Unversty and Foundaton France-Japon de I’EHESS on 7 October 2013 n Brussels. I would lke to
thank my paper’s dscussant, Zsolt Darvas, for hs thoughtful and useful comments, and am grateful to the other
conference partcpants.
34. Ths work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Nos. 24243024 and 25285100.
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1. Introduction
Ths chapter dscusses problems posed by unconventonalmonetary polces (UMPs)
from the vewpont of the nsttutonal framework of central bank ndependence. After
the Great Moderaton that began n the md-1980s, the mportance of prce stablty
for sustanable economc growth became wdely recognsed. Prce stablty became
the sole objectve of monetary polcy, and a number of central banks obtaned
ndependence from governments. At the same tme, gven the role that they play n a
democratc socety, central banks were requred to act wth transparency and
accountablty n return for ndependence.
In addton to dsclosure of decson makng by publshng the mnutes of polcy
meetngs, holdng frequent press conferences and speeches and usng other
platforms, the settng of polcy rules has been regarded as mportant to enhance
accountablty and transparency.Many central banks have adopted nﬂaton targetng;
the presentaton of numercal targets clarﬁes the polcy objectve. Furthermore,
because rule-settng s mportant for the control of polcy varables such as money
market rates, many central banks have adopted the Taylor Rule for the adjustment of
polcy varables, or at a mnmum they refer to ths rule. It s thought to mnmse the
room for dscreton and s regarded as a devce formantanng self-dscplne n terms
of accountablty.
The stuaton has changed utterly, however, snce central banks began adoptng UMPs
followng the recent global ﬁnancal crss. Many scholars have argued that snceUMPs
contan quas-ﬁscal polces, they should be mplementedwth government oversght.
And t has also been clamed that because central banks are expandng ther terrtores
as they carry out bank supervson n the name of macro-prudence, such actvtes
should also be coordnated wth the government.
Ths chapter dscusses another aspect of central bank ndependence n the current
stuaton, that s, the lack of polcy rules. As quanttatve easng (QE) s wdespread,
UMPs have not establshed a clear rule for the control of polcy varables such as the
outstandng balance of the current account at the central bank. Snce UMPs have
becomedscretonary, they are crtcsed as not suﬃcently accountable, even though
central banks have strengthened ther communcaton to the markets. In addton, t
generates a fallacy n economcs. Economc theory supples a foundaton for central
bank ndependence wth a vew to controllng nﬂaton. But the theoretcal foundaton
for central bank ndependencemay be eroded n an era of deﬂaton. In the lght of the
recent stuaton of deﬂaton, therefore, ths theoretcal foundaton should be revewed.
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I breﬂy dscuss UMPs n secton 2 and dscuss polcy eﬀectveness n secton 3. Snce
the Bank of Japanwas the ﬁrstmodern central bank to establsh a UMP, ts experence
s revewed n secton 4. After dscussng problems related to UMPs n secton 5, I
present a dﬀerent approach to central bank ndependence n secton 6. Concludng
remarks appear n secton 7.
2. Taxonomy of UmPs
When the Bank of Japan began ts zero nterest rate polcy n 1999, t was thought to
be exceptonal and consdered to be temporary. The Bank of Japan contnued
extraordnary polces such as QE n 2001-06, comprehensvemonetary easng (CME)
n 2010-13, and quanttatve and qualtatve easng (QQE) from2013. Followng n the
footsteps of theBank of Japan, central banks nmanyothermajor ndustral economes
adopted smlar polces followng the global ﬁnancal crss.
Broadly speakng, UMPs can be categorsed nto three types: (1) QE, (2) credt easng
(CE), and (3) forward gudance (FG).
The ﬁrst and second types, QE and CE, are essentally tools for lqudty control of the
ﬁnancal market and ﬁnancal sector. By means of QE, a central bank expands ts
balance sheet by njectng lqudty nto ts current account balance. Wth CE, a central
bank changes the composton of ts assets by purchasng rsky assets for whch the
market has usually been destablsed by a ﬁnancal crss (Bernanke, 2009).
Even though QE mght be sad to aﬀect the lablty sde and CE the asset sde, both
polces are categorsed as ‘balance-sheet polcy’ because ther eﬀects are seen
ntally on the balance sheet rather than through nterest rates or other economc
varables. By means of balance-sheet polcy, many central banks also ncrease the
number of ﬁnancal products for purchase through monetary operatons, and they
reduce the credt standards of products and collateral. These measures are smlar to
QE and CE polces, but such actons had been already taken durng prevous crss
perods. In more recent epsodes, however, when QE and CE were deployed, central
banks tended to serve as the lender of last resort, not to an ndvdual bank, as n
prevous perods, but to the entre system or market.
By commttng to contnue a partcular polcy untl a ﬁxed date or when certan
economc condtons are met, central banks control long-term nterest rates by
nﬂuencngmarket expectatons. Ths thrd type of UMP, FG, s not unquely a UMPs. In
the Unted States, ncreases n nterest rates at a ‘measured pace’ were mplemented
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by the Federal Reserve from 2004 to 2006. Japan also made a commtment to boost
domestc demand untl ts external mbalance was adjusted, whch created a ‘bubble’
by contnung a low nterest rate polcy n the late 1980s.
3. Evaluation of UmPs
In prncple, monetary polces succeed byworkng on nterest rates and asset values
together. As the nterest rate reaches zero and remans there, the wealth eﬀect
becomes the only remanng channel formonetary polcy. It s not surprsng, therefore,
that a one-handed polcy s less eﬀectve than a conventonal two-handed polcy.
Although FG s found to be somewhat eﬀectve n reducng long-term yelds, t s
another matter for t to boost nvestment and consumpton.
Whle some economsts have cted the eﬀectveness of UMPs, many thnk that UMPs
are eﬀectve for restorng ﬁnancal stablty but less so for boostng economc actvty
(Woodford, 2012).
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Figure 1: Balance sheet policies
Source: Shratsuka (2010).
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From the vewpont of ﬁnancal stablty, the eﬀects of UMPs are sgnﬁcant. Bymeans
of (1) QE, the provson of ample credt by central banks eases the lqudty shortage
of banks. And (2) CE s a more drect measure to resolve the malfunctonng of a
partcularmarket. For example, a large-scale purchase ofmortgage-backed securtes
(MBSs) by the Federal Reservemanaged to restore themortgagemarket that had been
heavly damaged by the US sub-prme crss. In Europe, the announcement of the start
of large-scale unlmted purchases of perpheral debt by the European Central Bank
stablsed the government bondmarkets.
At ﬁrst, UMPs were adopted as emergency measures for ﬁnancal stablty. But
gradually t began to be expected that they would boost economc actvty n place of
conventonal monetary polces.
Of the three types of UMPs, FG– although regarded prevously as supplementary to QE
and CE – has become a major polcy tool for economc recovery. Followng the zero
nterest rate polcy of the Bank of Japan, whch commtted n 2000 to contnung the
polcy untl deﬂaton concerns dsspated, the Federal Reserve followed wth QE1 and
the ntally reluctant Bank of England ﬁnally adopted FG n 2013. Both announced the
contnuaton of UMPs untl unemployment rates dropped to a certan level.
Whle many emprcal studes of QE and CE have been carred out, the results have
beenmxed. It s also dﬃcult to dstngush the eﬀects of QE and CE from those of FG,
so the exclusve eﬀects of QE and CE have not been establshed. In Japan, the results
are alsomxed for QE (Uga, 2007). Somestudes foundnopostve results, whle others
found the contrary (Honda, Kurok, and Tachbana, 2007). Recent work by the Bank of
Japan (Kmura and Nakajma, 2013) reveals that UMPs show a postve coeﬃcent
wth economc actvty but are emprcally neﬀectve. Ths appears to be the most
convncng result for polcymakers n Japan thus far35.
UMPs also pose problems n terms of reducng the sze of the balance sheet (QE) and
dscardng rsky assets (CE). Some argue that ths ‘ext’ problem could be resolved by
movng slowly. However, f an economc recoverymateralses, t s expected that bond
prces would fall. Some argue that snce central banks hold long-maturty assets
because of QE and CE, they would suﬀer a huge loss from the rsng long-term yeld,
whch – roncally – would result from an economc recovery. Some have argued that
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35. Whle some argue that unconventonal polces had some postve eﬀects on economc recovery n Japan, t s far
to say that recovery was manly supported by other factors such as the resoluton of the non-performng loan
problem n the Japanese bankng sector and an ncrease n external demand resultng from growng global trade
after Chna joned the World Trade Organsaton n 2001. The eﬀect of monetary polcy alone s not so clear.
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the loss should be compensated for by the government, rasng the ssue of central
bank ndependence.
FG also entals a problem. Snce t generates an expectaton that low-nterest rateswll
contnue for a long tme, t encourages speculaton by ncreasng leverage, whch could
heghten the volatlty of nterest rates.
FG entals a commtment that resembles a polcy rule. But as many have already
ponted out, t s essentally a dscretonary polcy for the control of polcy varables.
Inﬂaton targetng has the same nature; t can become a rule-type polcy equpped
wth the Taylor Rule. Furthermore, the recent targetng of unemployment by FG poses
a problem, even thoughmonetary polcy cannot control real varables. Unemployment
can only be consdered bymonetary polcy n the context of ts nﬂuence on nﬂaton.
So even f we admt that FG s a rule-type polcy, the wrong targets are assgned as ts
objectve.
Fnally, FG would be also dﬃcult to termnate36, because t can create expectatons
that are dﬃcult to change wthout confuson. In seekng to avod confuson, central
banks are lable to be tmd, as shown by the recent experence of ‘taperng’ QE3 n the
Unted States37.
4. Experience of the Bank of Japan
Takahash (2013) revewed more than 10 years of the hstory of UMPs conducted by
the Bank of Japan after t became ndependent n 1998.Whle the Bank of Japan does
not oﬃcally dscuss ‘mstakes’ n polcy operatons, n retrospect some aspects of the
operatons mght have been accomplshed wth more success.
A. Exit from the zero interest rate policy in 2000 and the QE in 2006
In the cases of the ext from the zero nterest rate polcy n 2000 and fromQE n 2006,
the Bank of Japanwas crtcsed for actng prematurely. In the case of the ext fromQE
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36. Rajan (2013) dscussed the dﬃculty of ‘ext’ fromUnconventonal polces by focusng on the ‘credblty’ of central
bank polces.
37. When the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced the termnaton of QE n May 2013, there was a huge drop n
stock prces. But when a smlar announcement wasmade n December 2013, the stock prces rose. Ths contrast
could be a result the Fed’s suggeston to extend the zero nterest rate n December. Although the termnaton was
focused on unconventonal polces, ths epsode proves the ﬁrst ncrease n the nterest rate after the ext from
unconventonal polcy s more mportant for markets. The Bank of Japan experenced a smlar reacton when t
stopped QE n 2006.
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n March 2006, the Bank of Japan announced the condton that t would contnue QE
untl the consumer prce ndex nﬂaton rate was stably above zero percent. However,
the target of zero nﬂaton was too low as a condton for the ext.
A more serous epsode was the ﬁrst ncrease n nterest rates n October 2006. The
Bank of Japan explaned that as nﬂaton rose, the real term nterest rate that was
calculated by deductng the nﬂaton rate from the nomnal nterest rate, would fall and
that a small ncrease n the polcy ratewould not have a negatve eﬀect. It was thought
that the tme had come to take precautonary acton.
Central banks have judged that precautonary polces are desrable to conduct forward-
lookng monetary polcy. Ths lesson was learned durng the era of nﬂaton n the
1970s and1980s. The stuaton of the zero lower bound nterest rate produced another
monetary polcy lesson, whch states that backward-lookng polcy acton s desrable
n the context of a zero nterest rate, labelled as the theory of ‘hstorcal dependence’38.
Snce ths theory became formalsed after the Lehman crss, the Bank of Japan dd
not fully take on ths lesson when t termnated QE n 2006.
B. Poor reaction to exchange rate changes during the CmE period
The Bank of Japan launched comprehensvemonetary easng (CME) n October 2010.
Although the Japanese ﬁnancal sector was relatvely less aﬀected by the Lehman
crss, the manufacturng and other non-ﬁnancal sectors were heavly mpacted. The
most damagng factor was a rse n exchange rates, whch roncally reﬂected the
comparatve ﬁnancal soundness of the Japanese ﬁnancal sector compared to those
of the Unted States and Europe.
Even though the responsblty for exchange-rate polcy n Japan belongs to the
Mnstry of Fnance and not to the central bank, the Bank of Japan showed great
concern about exchange rates, gven ther great nﬂuence on the economy.
Bymeans of CME, the Bank of Japan set up a separate fund to expand ts balance sheet
by purchasng Japanese government bonds and began to purchase real estate
nvestment trusts and exchange-traded funds. Ths combnedQE and CE. In termsof FG,
the Bank of Japan announced the contnuaton of polcy by settng the tmng of
termnaton.
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38. For the theory of ‘Hstorcal Dependence’, see Woodford (1999) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
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Ths degree ofmonetary easngwas bold at the tme. The outstandng current account
balance, whch s consdered a measure of monetary easng, exceeded the hghest
peaks durng the QE perod. But the Bank of Japan’s polces contnued to be crtcsed
as too lttle, too late.
In fact, the polcymeasureswere sometmes reactve. Decsonswere oftenmade after
an apprecaton n exchange rates, and t was clamed that qucker acton could have
prevented such an apprecaton. Polcy actons also seemed ad hoc and dscretonary.
Even though the Bank of Japan publshed the schedule of ncreases n funds, t dd
not reﬂect economc condtons.
In autumn 2012, the soon-to-be prmemnster, Shnzo Abe, began to heavly crtcse
the Bank of Japan for ts ‘reluctance’ n monetary easng. Ths was perhaps the
strongest attack on the ndependence of the Bank of Japan nmore than a decade. The
Bank of Japan had not succeeded n establshng ts polcy rule, a weakness that
nvted crtcsm from the poltcal sphere.
Ths stuaton mght be taken to show that even after a central bank obtans legal
ndependence, to mantan autonomy t s not suﬃcent for t to conduct polcy
ndependently. Followng the establshment of ts ndependence, the Bank of Japan
sought to avod poltcal conﬂct, by acceptng themnmum requrement n response
to the government. But ths strategy appears to have faled. From ths experence, a
lesson mght be drawn that a central bank should take a more proactve stance n
reactng to government polcy.
5. Problems of central bank independence under UmPs
The noton of ndependence s desgned for a central bank that pursues only prce
stablty n ts monetary polcy durng an era of nﬂaton, and that engages solely n
the conduct of monetary polcy. In lne wth ths thnkng, as typﬁed by the Bank of
England, the functon of bank supervson s separated from the central bank and the
central bank concentrates on controllng nﬂaton.
The global ﬁnancal crss, however, remnds us of the mportance of the central bank’s
lender-of-last-resort functon. The crss also suggests that snce central banks know
themarket well, t s approprate for them to supervse the bankng sector. Thus, central
banks have taken on the responsblty for bank supervson n the name of macro-
prudence and expanded ther regulatory terrtory. For example, the Federal Reserve
has expanded ts responsbltywthn the bankng sector, and ﬁnancal ntermedares
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such as lfe nsurance companes have come under the supervson of central banks
n some countres.
In addton, snce publc debt has ncreased dramatcally nmany countres, the control
of publc debt has becomea great concern for central banks. As suggested by the ﬁscal
theory of the prce level, central banks could lose control of nﬂaton f the sustanablty
of publc debt s gven prorty over prce stablty.
In place of the former arrangement nwhch a central bank pursued only prce stablty,
today’s central banks are consderng three types of stablty: prce stablty, ﬁnancal
stablty and ﬁscal stablty. Needless to say, the second and thrd types are judged to
be the busness of government. Thus, central bank ndependence has become an
ssue.
The theory of central bank ndependence has also been challenged. Essentally, t s
desgned for control of nﬂaton. As explaned by Rogoﬀ (1985), snce the government
and poltcans are nﬂaton based, the control of nﬂaton should be assgned to a
conservatve central bank that has a reputaton as an nﬂaton ﬁghter.
Followng the conservatve central bank model, n an era of deﬂaton, t could be
clamed that central bank ndependence should be relnqushed to overcomedeﬂaton.
Such a fallacy must be revewed.
6. A new foundation for central bank independence39
When central bank ndependence loses the foundaton accordng to whch central
banks pursue only prce stablty under the condton that the government and poltcs
are nﬂaton based, another foundaton for ndependence becomes necessary.
I would argue that ths reﬂects the fundamental and deep problem of the relatonshp
between poltcs and the economy. Althoughmany economes requred a great deal of
support from governments followng the ﬁnancal crss, the deal s that economes
should be self-governedwthmnmumgovernment nterventon. Hstorcally, captalst
economes have a tradton of self-governance. For example, the Cty of London has
sought to keep ts dstance from theWestmnster, the seat of government, for centures.
In Japan, even durng the centralsed rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate durng the Edo
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Perod (1603–1867), the Dojma market for rce futures n Osaka was managed by a
self-governng merchant’s guld.
Even though central banks have been establshed by ther respectve states, central
banks are postoned at the centre of the economy. As the economy should operate on
a self-governng bass, a central bank should be ndependent from the government
and poltcs.
The degree and nature of ndependence depends on the dstance between poltcs and
the economy n each naton. When an economy s stll underdeveloped, the govern-
ment plays a major role and central bank ndependence mght be weak. As the
economy develops, however, regulatons are modﬁed and prvatsaton proceeds. In
ths sense, central bank ndependence s smlar to prvatsaton, nwhch the economy
should operate based on the market mechansm.
As a pllar of the market, the central bank’s phlosophy s that ts nterventon n the
market should be mnmsed. Accordng to ths prncple, the central bank should
control the short-term spectrumof nterest rates and t s desrable tomantan a small
balance sheet. Needless to say, as government nterventon n the economy has
proceeded, snce the crss central banks have moved n the opposte drecton.
If a central bank begns to consder ﬁnancal stablty and ﬁscal stablty n addton to
prce stablty, t ncreasngly comes to resemble a poltcal entty. Even f we admt
that a central bank plays a role smlar to that of the government, ts ndependence
should be mantaned n a consttutonal framework so long as the dea of self-
governance of the economy s shared by socety. A consttutonal frameworkmandates
the ndependence of a publc entty to acheve a separaton of powers. Ths factor
should be consdered n support of the argument for central bank ndependence.
7. Concluding remarks
Although central banks have become poltcsed n the current crcumstances, central
bank ndependence should be mantaned as a pllar of self-governance n the
economy. Economcs tends to avod analysng the poltcal dmenson of economc
polcy. But t has become ncreasngly necessary n the current envronment to
consder ths poltcal dmenson n relaton to central banks. A consttutonal
framework, whch stpulates the ndependence of a publc entty by separaton of
powers, oﬀers promse for potental consderaton.
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monetary, ﬁscal and ﬁnancial
policies in Europe and Japan:
comments on ‘When central
bank independence is
challenged by unconventional
monetary policies’ by Wataru
Takahashi
ZSOlT dARVAS
Fiscal dominance and monetary policy
The ssue of ﬁscal domnancewas a central theme n ‘When central bank ndependence
s challenged by unconventonal monetary polces’ by Wataru Takahash. Fscal
domnance descrbes a stuaton n whch there s a threat to ﬁscal sustanablty
because of large publc debt and budget deﬁcts, potentally endangerng ﬁnancal and
macroeconomc stablty. Such a stuaton lmts the freedomof the central bank (ether
ndrectly by nternalsng the threat fromﬁscal unsustanablty, or drectly by pressure
from the government) n pursung the prce-stablty goal.
Mr Takahash carefully underscored the rsks to central bank ndependence n Japan
resultng from the hgh publc debt (whch forces the Bank of Japan to consder ﬁscal
sustanablty too when makng monetary polcy decsons), the possble poltcal
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nterference n the Bank of Japan by the government, and the large and ncreasng
holdngs of government securtes by the Bank of Japan (whch exposes the Bank of
Japan to losses f nterest rates were to rse).
Separately, t has been hghlghted, wth a focus on the role of the European Central
Bank (ECB), that themost mportant challenge s to avod ﬁscal domnance n order to
preserve credblty and ndependence. It has been emphassed that beyond helpng
to mtgate the escalaton of the crss, the ECB has entered the border area of ﬁscal
polcy and has also ganed weght n other mportant polcy ﬁelds, such as bankng
supervson (as the ECB wll be the sngle supervsor of major euro-area banks from
late 2014) and n the desgn, approval and montorng of ﬁnancal assstance
programmes for euro-area countres.
Whle sharng most of these conclusons, I would lke to oﬀer three man and
nterrelated comments:
(1) The need for and the eﬀectveness of unconventonal monetary polces,
(2) The approprateness of ﬁscal adjustment strateges durng the current crss, and
(3) The problems wth low nﬂaton.
Comment 1: Unconventional monetary policies
Frst, the lmts of unconventonal monetary polces, lke quanttatve easng of the
Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan and Bank of England and the unlmted lqudty
provson of the European Central Bank (ECB) have been hghlghted.Mr Takahash also
argued that whle unconventonal monetary polces were eﬀectve n restorng
ﬁnancal stablty, they were comparatvely less eﬀectve n boostng economc
actvty, such as nvestment and consumpton. He also crtcsed the less-accountable
nature of unconventonalmonetary polces, snce clear polcy rules, such as a Taylor-
rule (whch s a smple equaton prescrbng the central bank nterest rate as a functon
of nﬂaton and ameasure of economc actvty), cannot be set.
I agree that unconventonalmonetary nstruments havemajor lmtatons, but theman
queston swhat alternatvewas there?When the central bank nterest rate reaches the
zero lower bound, tradtonal central bank nstruments became powerless. A central
bank then can ether just st there dong nothng and hope that other polcy areas, such
as structural reforms and ﬁscal polcy, wll solve all problems, or t can expermentwth
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new and unconventonal nstruments. Snce hgh nﬂaton was not a threat (nstead,
the rsk of deﬂaton ncreased n advanced countres), the economeswerewell below
potental, a prolonged process of prvate sector deleveragng was seen comng and
therewas amajor shortage n demand, t was the rght choce to opt for unconventonal
monetary polces at the heght of the global ﬁnancal and economc crss.
Furthermore, nmost advanced countres, ncludng theUnted States, ﬁscal authortes
started consoldaton strateges after 2009, mplyng that even the ntal 2008-09
ﬁscal boost to the economyhas reversed.Wthout unconventonalmonetary polces,
economc outcomeswould have beenmuchworse and therefore t s dﬃcult to argue
that such polces dd not contrbutewell to nvestment and consumpton. Untl nﬂaton
and nﬂatonary expectatons are below target and ﬁnancal stablty s ensured and s
expected to preval, there s a ratonale for unconventonal monetary polces when
economc condtons are adverse.
In the specﬁc case of Japan, the exchange rate of the yen apprecated remarkably
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and stayed at ths apprecated and lkely
sgnﬁcantly overvalued level untl about md-2012 (see Darvas, 2013a). The strong
yen and the desperate Japanese economc stuatonwarranted a newpolcy approach.
Amore aggressvemonetary polcy, ncludng quanttatve easng, was the rght choce
n my vew, even though the jury s of course stll out concernng ts eﬀectveness.
In the euro area, the European Central Bank should have done more n terms of both
conventonal monetary polces (reducng the nterest rate closer to zero earler and
faster) and unconventonal monetary polces (such as a much more sgnﬁcant
quanttatve easng programme than the two relatvely small-scale covered bond
purchasng programmes40). In 2011, the euro area entered a second-dp recesson
wth weak prvate demand, strong focus on ﬁscal consoldaton, banks that were
vulnerable and unable to grant credt to the economy, and fallng nﬂaton. These
crcumstances made the aggregate economc stuaton of the euro area very weak,
but also made the envronment for the necessary ntra-euro adjustment much more
dﬃcult. Andwhle othermajor central banks opted formassve quanttatve easng, the
ECB only mplemented the two small programmes mentoned above. Ths kept the
exchange rate of the euro relatvely strong, alsomakng tmore dﬃcult to adjust ntra-
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Eurosystem commtted to buy covered bonds up to €60 bllon, whle n November 2011 the second CBPP
commtment was up to €40 bllon untl October 2012. These CBPPs were not sterlsed. On the contrary, the
government bonds purchased through the Securtes Market Programme (SMP) of the ECB were sterlsed, .e. the
sameamount of lqudtywas absorbed by the ECB and therefore the SMPwasnot a quanttatve easng programme.
See Darvas and Merler (2013).
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euro mbalances (Darvas, 2012). Therefore, earler and more forceful acton by the
European Central Bank would have been justﬁed.
Comment 2: Fiscal adjustment strategies
The second ssue I would lke to dscuss s euro-area ﬁscal adjustment strateges
durng the current crss. In ths regard the queston has been asked: was ﬁscal
adjustment “a self-defeating austerity in the face of large fiscal multipliers or
indispensable consolidation in a monetary union where some (sovereign) member
countries experience balance-of-payments crisis, sudden stops and fiscal limits”?
The way the queston was formulated suggests that the answer s the second story.
Whle I cannot agree more that ﬁscal consoldaton was necessary n the vulnerable
euro-area member states (though a crucal ssue s f t was done too quckly), one
cannot correlate the vulnerablemember stateswth thewhole euro area. The aggregate
ﬁscal deﬁct and debt n the euro area s relatvely low compared to other advanced
economes. Therefore, from an economc pont of vew, s was not that pressng to
pursue a rather rapd ﬁscal consoldaton strategy n the euro area as awhole, at a tme
when prvate demand was weak, the cyclcal poston of the economy worsened and
there were major adjustment challenges wthn the euro area, ncludng ntra-euro
relatve prce/wage adjustment (see more on ths n my thrd comment, below) and
prvate sector deleveragng.Whle I regard ﬁscal consoldaton at an approprate speed
to be nevtable n vulnerable member states, n those euro-area countres that had
healthy publc sector balance sheets, a ﬁscal expanson would have been justﬁed
(Darvas, 2013b). Proponents of ﬁscal consoldaton used to argue that the European
ﬁscal governance framework lmts ﬁscal polces and changng the framework once
agan s unrealstc. Whle agreengwth ths pont, I would lke to hghlght that even the
optons made possble by the European economc governance framework have not
been exploted (see Darvas and Vhrälä, 2013).
Comment 3: Low inﬂation
And thrdly, I would lke tomake some comments about the low level of nﬂaton, both
for Japan n the context of the ndependence of the Bank of Japan, and for Europe n
the context of the dual and conﬂctng goals of mproved prce compettveness and
debt sustanablty.
Japan faced a perod of about two decades wth close to zero nﬂaton. Zero nﬂaton
was lkely the reﬂecton of economc weaknesses. Earler central bank measures,
ncludng quanttatve easng, faled to restart nﬂaton. But the country should not gve
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up ts ﬁght aganst zero nﬂaton: low nﬂaton or deﬂatonmakes the sustanablty of
all knds of debtmore dﬃcult and renders adjustment of relatve prces and economc
actvty across economc sectormore problematc. Because of pressure fromMr Abe’s
government, n January 2013 the Bank of Japan’s nﬂaton target was ncreased from
one percent per year to two percent per year, whchwas seen by several observers as
nterference wth the ndependence of the Bank of Japan. However, a two percent per
year nﬂaton target s not at all extraordnary; such a ﬁgure s consdered n most
advanced countres as the rate of nﬂaton correspondng to prce stablty.
Furthermore, t s the legtmate rght of natonal governments and parlaments to
deﬁne the target of the central bank. The government s accountable to the parlament,
whch conssts of elected members, whle the central bank decson makers are
unelected oﬃcals. What s mportant for central bank ndependence s operatonal
ndependence, that s, the central bank should be able to decde on ts own,wthout any
external nterference, on how tomeet the nﬂaton target – and should be accountable
to the parlament for fulﬁllng ts mandates.
The euro area has unfortunately entered a low nﬂatonary envronment: the current
aggregate nﬂaton rate of the euro area s close to one percent per year and nﬂatonary
expectatons, ncludng the forecasts of the ECB, suggest that nﬂaton wll stay well
below the two percent threshold formanyyears. Beyond the rsk that shocks can push
the aggregate euro-area nﬂaton rate below zerowhen t s low, wth all the assocated
problems, there s a specal problemwth low aggregate nﬂaton n the euro area: the
dﬃcultes tmakes for ntra-euro rebalancng. Before the crss, prces andwages grew
much faster than productvty n southern euro-area members, whle nﬂaton was
about or even below productvty growth n core countres, such as Germany. There s
now a wdespread recognton that these accumulated dvergences have to be
corrected. Ths n fact has started, butmore s needed.When the average nﬂaton rate
n the euro area s low, eg one percent as currently, then nﬂaton n southern euro-
area members has to be even lower, eg zero, so that there s a suﬃcently hgh gap
relatve to German nﬂaton. But low nﬂaton worsens debt sustanablty. Therefore,
when average euro-area nﬂaton undershoots the two percent threshold, the conﬂct
between ntra-euro relatve prce adjustment and debt sustanablty s more severe,
as I argued n Darvas (2013c). The ECB should dowhatever t takes, wthn tsmandate,
to ensure that nﬂaton does not fall below the two percent threshold.
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Part 4:
What policy lessons to draw?
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lessons from the past two
decades and a preliminary
assessment of ‘Abenomics’
kIYOHIkO G. nISHImURA
1. Introduction
I ﬁrst draw three mportant lessons for current and future polcymakers from the
Japanese and European experences of the past two decades of so-called credt
bubbles and ther burstng. The extraordnary characterstcs of ths recent economc
hstory are lucdly demonstrated by the chapters n ths volume both about Japan
(around 1990 and thereafter) and Europe (around 2008 and thereafter).
Then, based on these lessons, I present a prelmnary assessment of ‘Abenomcs’ and
the ‘bold’ monetary polcy of the Bank of Japan. Ths assessment s ndeed very
prelmnary, sncemuch of the ‘beef’ of Abenomcs s stll to come at the tme of wrtng
(September 2013). However, ths assessment mght stll be more approprate than
otherwse, snce Japanese polcymakers have ntentonally or unntentonally learned
from these lessons drawn from past polcy experence (or past polcy mstakes, as n
Oscar Wlde’s famous quote41).
2. Three lessons from past experience
Although there aremany lessons (or regrets, to be precse) from the past twenty years
of polcy experence, I would lke to pck up three: A, B, and C.
87
41. “Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes,” n Oscar Wlde, Lady Windermere’s Fan, Act III, 1892.
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2.1 Avoid wishful thinking – face reality
The ﬁrst lesson starts wth the letter A, whch s ‘Avod wshful thnkng – face realty’.
We have seen overly optmstc forecasts so many tmes, not only n the so-called
bubble perod but also n the economc crss that followed. Wshful thnkng s
especally damagng n a crss, snce t leads to the behavour of ‘watng for the return
of the old normal’, whch never comes. Ths caused substantal delay n the
mplementaton of necessary polcy measures.
In fact, there s ample evdence of ntal under-estmaton of problems that later
became large and threatenng. The magntude of the mpact of non-performng loans
on the economy s the worst example of underestmaton and wshful thnkng of ths
knd, whchmade the balance sheet problems of Japan n the 1990s and the euro area
n the 2000s far severer and longer-lastng.
The stubbornness of such wshful thnkng s not conﬁned to estmates of non-
performng loan, however. It s rather strkng to see smlar wshful thnkng n
demographc forecasts. Ths s partcularly problematc n Japan, snce the negatve
mpact of unfavourable demographc condtons (e fewer chldren and more non-
workng old people) s one of the underlyng causes of the two-decade-long stagnaton
n domestc demand n Japan. Ths ssue, whch s often dubbed populaton-ageng,
should have been gven more attenton much earler, and approprate polces to
counter ts negatve mpact should have been devsed and mplemented much more
forcefully.
Fgures 1 and 2 llustrate the presence of wshful thnkng even n the professonal
forecasts of demographers. Fgure 1 shows the hstory of revsons of the Japanese
total-fertlty rate forecast. The dark blue lne s the actual fertlty rate. The lght blue lne
shows the forecasts made n 1976, 1986, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2006. The red lne
shows where we are, that s, the 2012 forecast.
These forecast lnes show a clear pattern nwhch the forecaster thnks the mmedate
past s not normal and the fertlty rate wll eventually come back to the normal level.
It also shows that demographers have been very slow to learn from the past
experence: t takesmore than thrty years to ‘catch up’ to actual declnes n the fertlty
rate. Fgure 2 shows the same pattern s found n the lfe-expectancy forecast.
The change n populaton s slow compared to other determnants of aggregate
demand, and s consdered to be perfectly forecastable. Ths s roughly true when we
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Figure 1: Revisions to the Japanese total fertility rate forecast
Source: Mnstry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Natonal Insttute of Populaton and Socal Securty Research.
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Figure 2: Revisions to the Japanese life expectancy forecast
Source: Mnstry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Natonal Insttute of Populaton and Socal Securty Research.
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consder the economyonly for the next two to three years. However, t s awfullywrong
to assume so for forecasts of next two to three decades, and the prce of falure to
recognse ths problemmght be qute szable, as the Japanese experence of the past
forty years suggests.
2.2 Be proactive, not reactive
The second lesson starts wth the letter B: ‘Be proactve, not reactve’. Polcymakers
are ncreasngly under pressurewth respect to ther accountablty, whch mples that
ther polces should be evdence-based. Then, even n the case that polcymakers
‘sense’ szable changes n the most recent economc condtons (for example, n
sentment surveys), they tend to avod makng decson mmedately when avalable
economc data do not show these changes. They do not want to make ‘premature’
judgments that mght nduce future crtcsm42. They smply wat and see more data
(evdence) to conﬁrm the changes. Ths mght be wse n normal tmes, but t s not
always so n crss tmes. Unfortunately, data s often too naccurate and comes too
late as we see n the followng example.
Table 1: History of GDP revision (Base year = 2000)
Release 13 nov 17 nov 20 may 17 Aug 16 nov 9 dec 14 feb final
Date 2007 2008 2009 2009 2009 2010 2011 14 nov
2011
2007/ Q3 2.6 2.3 0.8 -0.4 -2.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.1
2008/ Q3 -0.4 -2.5 -3.9 -6.5 -4.6 -5 -5.2
2009/ 1Q -15.2 -11.7 -12.2 -19.9 -20.1 -17.7
2009/ 2Q 3.7 2.7 11.3 10.8 8.4
2009/ 3Q 4.8 -1.2 -1.9 -2.3
Source: Cabnet Oﬃce. Note: The release date of the quarterly estmate of annualsed quarterly GDP growth s shown
n the top row, and the left-most column lsts the quarter that I would lke to examne. It should be noted that the
quarterly growth estmate of a partcular quarter changes as new raw data ﬂows n and old raw data s revsed and
new seasonal adjustments are appled. The rght-most column s the ‘ﬁnal estmate’ of the quarterly growth of GDP
(base year = 2000), whch was released on 14 November 2011.
Table 1 shows the hstory of GDP revson n Japan. The release date of the quarterly
estmate of annualsed quarterly GDP growth s shown n the top row, and the left-most
column lsts the quarter whch I would lke to examne. It should be noted that the
quarterly growth estmate of a partcular quarter changes as new rawdata ﬂows n and
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thus they are very senstve to avod such crtcsm. See, for example, Mzuno (2006).
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old raw data s revsed, and as new seasonal adjustment s appled. The rght-most
column s the ‘ﬁnal estmate’ of quarterly GDP growth (base year = 2000), whch was
publshed on 14 November 2011.
I pck the key ponts at whch polcy acton was surely needed: 2007Q3 when the so-
called Parbas shock occurred; 2008Q3when LehmanBrothers collapsed, and2009Q1
to 2009Q3 where the crss deepened. Here we see a clear pattern of repeated ntal
underestmaton of the problem. For example, on 13 November 2007, the Japanese
Cabnet Oﬃce announced ts ntal annualsed quarterly growth estmate of the thrd
quarter (July to September) of 2007, whch was 2.6 percent, a qute decent number
compared to the Bank of Japan’s estmate of the potental growth at that tme, whch
was slghtly below 1 percent. Then, ensung revsons showed a sharp declne n the
growth rate, and by 2007Q3 the growth rate had become a large negatve number of –
2.3 percent when the 2009Q3 data came out on 16 November 2009. A decent growth
rate turned out to be a sharp contracton. Although the ﬁnal estmate (–1.1 percent)
was a lttle hgher than the one of 16 November 2009, t was stll a large negatve. Ths
pattern was repeated n 2008Q3 (from –0.4 percent to –6.5 percent then endng at –
5.2 percent) and 2009Q3 (4.8 percent to –2.3 percent). Thus, n these crucal perods,
the GDP statstcswere not a good gude for economc polcy. In partcular, the tendency
towards ntal underestmaton was partcularly problematc.
I take up GDP ﬁgures here for llustraton. The same problem s found n many other
statstcal data, so t s not unque to GDP. The pont s that ‘current’ data mght grossly
be nadequate or msleadng at the tme of crss. They mght come too late (because
of the consderable tme needed to collect and process statstcs), mght be too
naccurate andmght be qute msleadng.
2.3 Communicate eﬀectively
The thrd lesson, whch s closely related to the second and the ﬁrst, s: ‘Communcate
eﬀectvely’.When theeconomyundergoesdeepstructural change, theoldwayof thnkng
sno longervaldboth n themanstreetand theﬁnancalmarket. Then, thecommuncaton
polcy becomes all themore mportant to explan the problemwe face and the polcywe
need. Moreover, n the age of nformaton and communcaton, consumers and nvestors
often show that they are susceptble to herd behavour, whch often leads to excessve
optmsmongooddaysandexcessvepessmsmonbaddays43. Thepolcymakerneeds
versatle ablty of eﬀectve communcaton to counteract such excess.
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Ths s a dﬃcult task ndeed, snce t nvolves ssues of credblty. One smplemstake
may jeopardse a polcymaker’s entre credblty. However, at the same tme, the
polcymaker s subject to consderable uncertanty, often facng ‘unknownunknowns’
(completely unexpected events) rather than ‘knownunknowns’ (forecastable events)
at the tme of crss. Then, t s necessary for the polcymaker to be ﬂexble enough to
adjust to unexpected events. However, such adjustment should not be vewed by the
publc as a manfestaton of the polcymaker’s nablty to control the stuaton. Thus,
communcaton polcy s not smply to announce forecasts and polcy ntentons. It
should also nvolve careful ‘credblty management’.
3. Abenomics and ‘bold’ monetary policy
3.1 Background: four woes
Before makng an assessment of so-called Abenomcs, t s necessary to look nto ts
background. Therewere four woes n the Japanese economy n December 2012, when
Abenomcs was ﬁrst presented n the meda. They were n fact a seres of bad luck,
though the last twomght be more than that.
The ﬁrst was the unprecedented real sde eﬀects of the global ﬁnancal crss trggered
by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, especally n 2009, and those of the European
soveregn crss of 2010. Although the drect eﬀects of the ﬁnancal crss were much
smaller n Japan than n the Unted States and Europe, the bankng crss had severe
contractonary eﬀects on Japanese exports of durables. It should be noted that credt
avalablty has become one of the man determnants of major aggregate demand
components such as automobles and home applances. Thus, the bankng crss
exerted unevenly severe eﬀects on the demand for durable goods, and themachnes
that are needed to produce such durables. Snce Japan was specalsed n durable
goods manufacturng, the country was ht partcularly severely.
The secondwoewas a seres of natural dsasters, and accdents that followed. InMarch
2011, the great northern Japan earthquake ht the country, at the tme when the
Japanese economy was showng sgns of a recovery from the deep recesson that
followed the global ﬁnancal crss of 2009 and the European soveregn debt crss of
2010. Although reconstructon eﬀorts typcally ncrease economc actvty after an
earthquake, the great northern Japan earthquake dd not, snce the tsunam that t
trggered caused the nuclear power plant accdent n Fukushma, whchwas theworst
event of ths knd n the past two decades. Ths had a devastatng eﬀect on consumer
sentment and eﬀectvely klled the nascent recovery at that tme.Moreover, all nuclear
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power plants were shut down because of the publc concern for safety, makng fossl
fuel mports surge and the current account surplus shrnk dramatcally. The condtons
worsened later n the year when the Tha ﬂood of 2011 dsrupted the supply chans of
Japanese manufacturers, whch caused severe supply shortages worldwde and
aﬀected exportng companes’ proﬁts negatvely.
The thrd woe was the persstent over-valuaton of the yen. The yen apprecated
consderably from ¥106 to the dollar n June 2008 to ¥77 n December 2011. Ths
duraton durng whch the yen was elevated was unprecedented: The yen stayed n
the ¥80s for more than two and a half years. The yen’s strength was artﬁcally
enhanced by two factors. Frst, snce the dollar and the euro somewhat lost ther allure
as safe-haven currences durng ther ﬁnancal crss, the relatve attractveness of the
yenwas ncreased because of the relatve stablty of the Japanese economy and the
predctablty of economc polcy. (The yen was often called a ‘safe parkng lot’).
Second, (especally foregn) nvestors apparently gnored the magntude of trade-
deﬁct eﬀects of the nuclear power plant shutdowns. Markets were very slow to
recognse the mpacts of energy costs on the Japanese current account surplus.
The fourth woe was ‘reactve’ polces. Unfortunately, Japanese polcy makng before
Abenomcs of December 2012 was plagued by nacton, delay and characterstc
reactveness. Ths was partly due to the poltcal nstablty that followed the ouster of
the Lberal Democratc Party from power n July 2009 at the tme of deep economc
trouble. The lack of poltcal leadershp, or statesmanshp, became ncreasngly
apparent both n the rulng and opposng partes n the mdst of natural dsasters and
economc contracton. These observatons lead to prevalent pessmsm n busness
and consumer sentment.
To put t succnctly, November 2011was the lowest ebb n both economc actvtes and
busness and consumer sentment. It was the rght tme to make a change.
3.2 Abenomics and ‘bold’ monetary policy
In essence, Abenomcs s the ‘three-arrow’ promse. The ﬁrst arrow s ‘bold’ monetary
polcy pressurng the Bank of Japan to easemonetary polcy substantally; the second
s ‘ﬂexble’ ﬁscal polcy of government expendture under the name of strengthenng
socal nfrastructure; and the thrd s nvestment-enhancng structural reform.
The bold monetary polcy, ncludng explct two-percent nﬂaton targetng, was
advocated n the electon campagn of December 2012. After the electon, the newly-
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elected Abe government and the Bank of Japan negotated and ssued a jont
statement that “the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI)”. The Bank also announced that “the Bank will pursue
monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time”.
The substantve part, however, of the bold monetary polcy of Abenomcs was the
polcy change of 4 Aprl 2013 after the leadershp at the Bank had changed. The core
of the polcy change was “quantitative and qualitative easing”, whch was succnctly
dubbed Q2 easng. In the quanttatve easng part, the Bank promsed to double the
sze of the central bank’s balance sheet wthn one year, through massve purchases
of Japanese government bonds. In the qualtatve easng part, the Bank promsed to
more than double ts purchase of exchange-traded funds (stocks) and to ncrease ts
purchase of Japan real estate nvestment trusts. The bank also promsed to buy
Japanese government bonds of substantally longer maturty, and thus to drectly
nﬂuence longer-end government bond markets. The Bank also made the pledge that
t would acheve the two percent goal n two years44.
Themagntude of ths Bank of Japan’s polcy s llustrated by Fgures 3 and 4. In Fgure
3, the rato of the central bank’s balance sheet to nomnal GDP was projected n Aprl
2013 for four central banks: the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank
of Japan and the People’s Bank of Chna. The ﬁgure s astonshng. The Bank of Japan
trpled ths rato n ten years from 1994, and the Fed dd n a smlar way startng n
2007 n four years. The 4 Aprl decson showed that the Bank of Japan thought the
sze of the balance sheet was nadequate and would double t decsvely n one year.
The bank would topple the People’s Bank of Chna n 2014, whch had a much less
developed ﬁnancal system and thus greater demand for currency.
Fgure 4 shows total government bond ssuance and the share of central bank
purchases projected agan n Aprl 2013. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2013, the Fed’s purchase
accounted for 28 percent of the total government bond ssuance. Ths was szable and
strred controversy because the Fed became awhale n the pond dstortng the normal
functonng of the ﬁnancal market, especally wth respect to the prce ﬁndng
mechansmof themarket. In contrast, the bank of Japanwould buy 76 percent of total
government bond ssuance n the ﬁscal year 2013. If the Fed s a whale n the pond,
thenwhat s the Bank of Japan? It would clearly dstort themarket and rase a spectre
of debt monetsaton n several corners of the ﬁnancal market.
LESSONS FOR POLICY
94
44. The polcy change, however, was not nnovatve, but smply to “domuch,muchmore”. In ths sense, the phrase used
by Governor Kuroda, “a policy of a different level”, s approprate. See Nshmura (2013).
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Figure 3: Central banks’ balance sheet to nominal GDP ratio projected on 4 April
2013
Source: Totan Research.
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3.3 Spectacular initial success and mid-year falter
It s far to say that Abenomcs has had a spectacular ntal success. It changed the
market sentment or expectatons drastcally n a way unseen for the past three
decades. The sentment changed almost by one hundred and eghty degrees n the
ntal ﬁve months from December to May, from pessmsm to optmsm. Ths was
especally the case n news meda. People (at least those who were ntervewed by
the meda) once complanng that “my glass is half empty, and things are not
improving”were nstead sayng that “it is half full and things are getting better”, even
though not much had been changed n real terms.
Abenomcs was partcularly successful n changng the nternatonal percepton of
Japanese poltcs. For example, one promnent nternatonal securty expert descrbed
Abe as one of three “true leaders” remanng n the globe45. Thus, the more foregn
nvestors were n the market, the hgher the prces were. Foregn exchange and stock
markets were a good example of Abenomcs’s success n changng the behavour of
foregn nvestors. In contrast, domestcmarkets for goods and servces dd not change
as much as ﬁnancal markets.
Perhaps roncally, however, Abenomcs’s momentum has faded snce the Bank of
Japan’s bold monetary polcy was put nto full moton. Asset prces were hgher, but
ther volatlty ncreased consderably.
Fgure 5 shows the movements of stock prces, the Nkke 225. The Nkke clmbed
from about 9,000 n November to 15,138 on 16 May. However, the market has lost
clear upwardmomentum snce then, whle volatlty has notceably ncreased. Fgure
6 llustrates the eﬀect of the Bank of Japan’s polcy change on the 10-year Japanese
government bond rate. Abenomcs had a szable eﬀect on the long-term Japanese
government bond rate, whchwas themost mportant reference rate showng nvestors’
assessment of ﬁnancalmarket condtons. Fromabout 0.75 percent, ths rsk-free rate
went down all theway to below0.5 percent. However, after the polcy change of 4 Aprl,
t shot up to 0.9 percent and became very volatle, though ts level went down and
volatlty has decreased somewhat snce then.
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Figure 5: Stock markets: Nikkei 225
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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Figure 6: Bond markets: 10-Year Japanese government bond rate
Source: Japan Bond Tradng Co., Ltd.
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A smlar story s found n the real economy, especally n busness and consumer
sentment surveys. Fgure 7 shows the movement of the sentment ndces of the
EconomyWatchers Survey, whch s known for a hgh correlatonwth GDP growth. Ths
s a survey of those who have close contacts wth ﬁrms and consumers, such as tax
drvers, recrutng agences and so on. Although t s not a statstcally desgned survey,
t has a good track record wth respect to GDP growth, and t s almost concurrently
avalable wth only a short lag. In Fgure 7, both busness and consumer sentment
ndces mproved and moved up untl Aprl (the Bank of Japan’s polcy change) and
then lost upwardmomentum, stallng fromMay to August. Fgure 8 shows the change
n consumer conﬁdence n the Consumer Conﬁdence Survey, where the blue zone
ndcates recesson. Consumer conﬁdencemoved up untl May, and then stalled from
June to August.
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Figure 7: EconomyWatchers Survey
Source: Economc Watchers Survey, Cabnet Oﬃce.
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4. Recapitulation and a preliminary assessment of Abenomics
In ths secton, I ﬁrst revst the ﬁndngs n secton 3 and then present a prelmnary
assessment of Abenomcs based on the three lessons n secton 2.
Abenomcs had a spectacular ntal success n changng the naton’s mood, whch
partcularlymattered n poltcs. Prmemnster Abe apparently learned at least partly
from the lessons I outlned n secton 2. In partcular, Abenomcs was proactve, not
reactve. Abenomcswas consdered to be a bold, decsve polcy ntatve, not reactng
to ever-changng, nosy current condtons, but proactvely actng for future secular
change. Moreover, the prme mnster’s communcaton polcy was mpressvely
successful n convncng ﬁrms and consumers that a better futurewas ahead of them,
or at least that the worst was over.
The upward momentum of Abenomcs, however, faded after the Bank of Japan’s so-
called bold polcy change, n both ﬁnancalmarkets and real economy, whle volatlty
ncreased substantally n ﬁnancal markets. Ths s somewhat ronc, snce the polcy
change was ntended to put Abenomcs n full moton. In fact, the polcy change was
really darng and surprsed even those who antcpated an about-face n the polcy
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Figure 8: Consumer Confidence Survey
Source: Consumer Conﬁdence Survey, Cabnet Oﬃce.
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stance, whch was once descrbed as ﬁnancally ncremental and a return to the
ncremental polcy of the past. But unfortunately, t also ncreased uncertanty
substantally about future monetary polcy and ﬁnancal condtons, especally wth
respect to future long-term rates and long-term nﬂaton. The Bank dd not explan ts
vew about these ssues, and even refused to do so, sayng that t was premature46.
Thus, t was no wonder that themarkets became volatle and busness and consumer
conﬁdence faltered n the face of greater uncertanty.
There are two lngerng questons to be answered forcefully by the Bank of Japan. Frst,
how can the bank rase nﬂatonary expectatons substantally n two years, even
thoughmostmarket partcpants reman skeptcal? Second, suppose that the Bank s
successful n achevng the two percent n two years goal. Then, what ﬁnancal
condtons, especally long-term government bond rates, are to be expected n two
years from now?
It s unfortunately the case that the Bank of Japan faled to recognse two of the
mportant lessons from the past that I have detaled n secton 2. The bank clearly
needs a persuasve communcaton polcy to show to the publc where t s headng
and what knd of contngent plans t has n the case unfavourable condtons emerge.
Above all, the bank has to show t s free from wshful thnkng, by presentng forceful
arguments and supportng data to show that the two percent n two years goal s n
fact achevable.
A careful observer of the Japanese consumer prce ndex understands that the past
deﬂaton s the result of the prolonged below-normal economc actvty of the past
several years, and thatwhen the economypcks up, one percent nﬂaton s achevable
n one to two years47. After all, long-run nﬂatonary expectatons have been stable at
one percent formore than a decade. However, to rase these nﬂatonary expectatons
by one more percent s a dﬀerent matter altogether. So far, the bank mantans the
poston that ther ﬁrmdetermnaton of the two percent goal s suﬃcent to rase long-
term nﬂatonary expectatons. One crtc aptly dubs ths poston a psychoknetc
theory of nﬂatonary expectatons48. Certanly we need more explanaton on ths
matter.
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48. See: http://kedanobuo.lvedoor.bz/archves/51869937.html.
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Abenomcs’ faded momentum so far s partly due to the return of uncertanty about
the future, not only aboutmonetary polcy but also ﬁscal polcy and structural reform.
As t stands now, Abenomcs s largely stll a promse, especally wth respect to ts
most mportant ‘thrd arrow’ of (nvestment-enhancng) structural reform. Moreover,
there s fear among people both n the street and the ﬁnancalmarkets that temporary
loosenng of ﬁscal consoldaton may turn out to be permanent, and thus eventually
lead to debt monetsaton49.
Here, there s a pressng need to show that the prme mnster s free from wshful
thnkng and that he s an eﬀectve communcator as well. He should explan: what
structural reformwll the Abe government mplement, whch s eﬀectve to rase growth
potental (nvestment) and to counteract populaton ageng (labour)? Also he should
elucdate: what s the road map of the ﬁnancal consoldaton, whch s bold to be
eﬀectve and realstc to be persuasve?
Concluding remarks
To conclude, I would lke to emphasse that there s a good chance of ultmate success
for Abenomcs. Frst, and above all, the Japanese economy s n a natural recovery
phase from prolonged below-normal economc actvty caused by a seres of
unexpected negatve shocks such as the Fukushma nuclear power plant accdent.
And so far, there s no addtonal bad luck, and we see some good luck such as the
2020 Olympc Games n Tokyo. Secondly, the publc stll has a favourable percepton
of the Abe cabnet and ts economc polcy, whch brngs poltcal stablty.
It s, however, absolutely necessary for ultmate success to learn from three lessons
of the past, as descrbed n Secton 1, summarsed n three dcta: avodwshful thnkng,
be proactve and communcate eﬀectvely.Moreover, economc andpoltcal condtons
are dynamc and full of unknown unknowns. In such dynamc condtons, the
polcymaker should be ﬂexble enough to follow these three dcta, and be able to show
that the three dcta are beng followed. Avod hubrs, to say the least.
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Japan and the EU in the global
economy – challenges and
opportunities
PETER PRAET50
Snce the begnnng of the ﬁnancal crss, there has been no shortage of challenges
along the road back towhat I would call the ‘normal functonng’ of our economes. One
of the bggest challenges s stll to be addressed: that of how to grow n an era of
deleveragng. Deleveragng can occur n an orderly fashon or t can be chaotc. It may
drag our economes downor t can place themon a stronger footng.Whch of thesewll
be the case depends to a great extent on how wemanage the process.
As wtnessed n Japan, protracted and large-scale balance sheet adjustments can
weaken economc actvty over a protracted perod. Reparng the ﬁnancal sector was
an mportant element n mprovng the Japanese economy. The lesson for the euro
area appears to be clear: the overhaul of the ﬁnancal archtecture – ncludng the
establshment of a procedure for resolvng falng banks – needs to be accomplshed
n ts entrety; selectve mendng wll not be enough. We should make use of the
momentum oﬀered by the crss to turn these challenges nto opportuntes –
opportuntes to put our economes on a sounder footng.
Imbalances in Japan and the euro area
The Japanese experence provdes mportant lessons because t demonstrates the
dﬃcultes of emergng from a ‘balance sheet recesson’51. Wth the euro area stll
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battlng the mpact of the ﬁnancal crss, an mportant queston s: how does the
current euro-area economy comparewth the dynamcs n Japan durng the 1990s52?
Both epsodes clearly share elements of a ‘balance sheet recesson’, n whch strong
credt expanson ends wth a sharp correcton n asset prces, thereby trggerng the
need for sgnﬁcant balance-sheet adjustment.
Yet, the scope of the requred adjustment n the euro areawhen vewed at the aggregate
level dﬀers markedly from that n Japan, even f some euro-area countres struggle
wth excessve leverage.
In Japan, the sharp fall n equty prces from the 1989 peak led to losses of almost 80
percent n the two decades that followed. Real estate prces also tumbled, wth urban
land prces declnng by about 40 percent. By comparson, at the euro-area aggregate
level, equty prces fell by about 50 percent and have already rebounded from ther
post-Lehman trough, whle resdental property prces have fallen by amere 3 percent
snce ther peak n 2008.
Moreover, the levels of ndebtedness across sectors clearly dﬀer. As for ﬁscal
mbalances, the ﬁscal response n Japan meant an ncrease n publc debt from 67
percent of GDP at the start of the 1990s to about 240 percent n 2012. For the euro
area as a whole, the ncrease was much smaller, wth aggregate debt ncreasng from
below 70 percent n 2008 to 92 percent n 2012. Obvously, the euro-area aggregate
ﬁgures mask the sgnﬁcant heterogenety between member states, wth gross debt
rangng from 10 percent of GDP n Estona to 157 percent n Greece. That notwth-
standng, t goes wthout sayng that general debt levels n European countres need
to declne, also because of long-term demographc challenges.
Turnng to prvate sector debt, Japan faced severe adjustment needs n the corporate
sector, wth debt of non-ﬁnancal corporatons declnng from130percent to 80percent
of GDP n the 15 years that followed the peak n economc actvty. In the euro area,
the debt level of the aggregate non-ﬁnancal sector never reached the peaks seen n
Japan and aggregate household ndebtedness s also comparatvely lower n the euro
area. However, n those euro-area countres that experenced housng bubbles, the
household sectors have been facngmuch greater adjustment problems. Here, agan,
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euro-area averages mask sgnﬁcant heterogenety betweenmember states.
In fact, some euro-area countres have seen strong captal nﬂows and unsustanable
debt-ﬁnanced economc expanson. Ths has not only brought the rsk of reversal, as
seen after 2008whenprvate captal nﬂowsdred up anddomestc demand collapsed,
t has also led to economc dvergence wthn the euro area. Some countres have lost
heavly n terms of compettveness relatve to ther peer euro-area countres.
Reganng ths compettveness wll ndeed be amore gradual and tedous process53.
The credt-ﬁnanced housng boom n countres such as Ireland and Span led to
resdental property prces more than doublng n the seven years leadng up to ther
peak. Snce the peak, adjustments n house prces appear to have been completed n
Ireland, whle those n Span are correctng more gradually. In both cases, the house
prce boom has left household debt-to-ncome ratos far above ther pre-crss levels
wth only a slow declne.
To summarse, whle euro-area aggregate dynamcs appear dﬀerent from those
observed n Japan at the begnnng of the 1990s, some euro-area countres do share
some features that are very smlar to the Japanese experence n that a prolonged
balance-sheet adjustment s underway.
Notwthstandng ths cross-country heterogenety, a common responsewas requred
frommonetary polcy n the euro area to counter the ntal fallout. The cuts n European
Central Bank polcy rates together wth non-standardmeasureswere crucal to contan
the rsks to prce stablty and to support the transmsson of monetary polcy across
the currency area.Whle commonmonetary polcy has been successful, the crss has
shown thatwe needmore sold common nsttutons n other polcy areas. In partcular,
a commonmonetary polcy requres a common regulatory framework for the ﬁnancal
sector to be able to adequately repar the ﬁnancal system, thereby securng a durable
recovery n the euro area. The adverse mpact of ‘zombe banks’ and the evergreenng
of loans n Japan serve as a stark warnng sgnal.
Gven the challenges ahead, we should not relax our eﬀorts to put the euro-area
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economes on track to strong and sustanable growth. Thatway, we can turn the current
challenges nto opportuntes. Furthermanagng the deleveragng processwll be key,
especally balancng the speed of adjustment and reformng euro-area governance.
Let me elaborate on these two aspects n turn.
managing the deleveraging process
To overcomedebt overhangs, there are bascally two optons: consoldate or restructure
debt to address the nomnal debt stock; or mplement growth-enhancng structural
reforms thatmake our economes ﬁtter to growout of the debt burden. Or a combnaton
of both can be pursued. A thrd theoretcally possble opton allowng for hgher nﬂaton
to reduce the real value of the debtwould go aganst the coremandate of central banks.
In recent years, we have seen some consoldaton n Europe. In terms of publc
ﬁnances, euro-area ﬁscal deﬁcts exceeded 6 percent at the peak of the crss n 2009
and 2010, but are expected to fall below3 percent n 2013, whle prmary budgets are
even expected to post a surplus of 0.2 percent54. Ths adjustment strategy has brought
wth t panful cuts to our socal models and has not been wthout controversy.
In fact, some commentators and academcs suggest that governments should
contnue ncreasng deﬁcts to support aggregate demand whle the prvate sector s
deleveragng. They argue that parts of the prvate sector are debt-constraned andneed
to reduce ther leverage, whle parts that are unconstraned are not ncreasng ther
leverage suﬃcently55. In such an envronment, the role for government spendng s to
expand demand for funds, and especally so when the nomnal nterest rate s
constraned by the zero lower bound56. I would agree wth ths approach f the ﬁscal
budget allowed for room formanoeuvre. But the recent soveregn debt crss has shown
that ﬁscal space s very lmted for many European countres.
In Japan, the strategy of ﬁscal expanson has led to a stuaton n whch gross
government debt levels now exceed 200 percent of GDP. The contnued favourable
ﬁnancng condtons appear to also be down to the fact that more than 90 percent of
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55. See Eggertsson, G. and P. Krugman (2012) ‘Debt, Deleveragng, and the Lqudty Trap: A Fsher-Mnsky-Koo
Approach’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (3): 1469-1513, and Guerrer, V. and G. Lorenzon (2011) ‘Credt
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56. See also the seres on deleveragng by Martn Wolf n the Financial Times, startng wth ‘We stll have that snkng
feelng’, Financial Times, 10 July 2012, and ‘Ways to accelerate prvate-sector deleveragng’, 30 July 2012.
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Japanese government bonds are held domestcally. Ths stuaton can be seen as a
specal prvlege for the government. But the hgh exposure of banks to ther domestc
soveregn – n fact, Japanese banks hold about 20 percent of ther assets n domestc
soveregn bonds – s not wthout rsks, especally n the event of sudden reversals n
market conﬁdence. Mantanng ﬁnancal and economc stablty therefore requres a
clear and long-term ﬁscal strategy to avod dsruptons. Ths s true for Japan and
Europe alke.
Debt consoldaton s not lmted to the publc sector, however; t also apples to areas
of the prvate sector wth excess leverage. Whle n the euro area the rato of ﬁnancal
sector labltes to GDP has broadly stablsed, euro-area large and complex bankng
groups have steadly ncreased the medan core Ter 1 rato from 8.3 percent n 2009
to above 11 percent n 201357.
To strengthen ther captal poston, banks have ssued equty, converted hybrds,
receved captal njectons and rased the levels of retaned earnngs. The stronger
captal postons alsomean that the relatve share of debt n ﬁnancng s reduced and
substtuted by more equty, whch should provde a better buﬀer aganst economc
shocks. After all, debt s a relatvely nﬂexble form of ﬁnancng because t requres
repayments on tme and n full.
But the stronger captal postons have also meant that banks have been sheddng
assets, a process that depresses credt growth and puts a drag on the economy. In
addton, as households and non-ﬁnancal corporatons also reduce ther
ndebtedness, they are demandng less ﬁnancng from banks. Taken together, we can
expect that bloated balance sheets wll contract further.
It s mportant that ths deleveragng process occurs n an orderlymanner by balancng
the adjustment of assets and labltes. Most of all, unnecessary ﬁre sales generatng
detrmental falls n asset prces and credt ratonng for productve nvestments need
to be avoded. Throughout the crss, the ECB has demonstrated ts ablty to actvely
mtgate these eﬀects by ensurng abundant fundng to the bankng sector through ts
lqudty operatons. Butmore s needed, especally regardng amore sold nsttutonal
framework to repar balance sheets n a way that lmts systemc rsk and avods
damage to the real economy.
The Japanese experence has shown the rsks that arse when banks’ balance sheet
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problems are not recognsed and addressed. Weakly captalsed banks ntally
extended loans to nsolvent ﬁrms to lmt the recognton of losses n the short run.
Indcatons of evergreenng became promnent as the share of loans to the
constructon sector contnued rsng for years after the bubble had burst, despte the
fact that ths sector was adjustng and needed to downsze. Wrte-oﬀs on non-
performng loans and necessary recaptalsatons were delayed and the ﬁnancal
sector remaned hghly vulnerable to shocks. But delayed recognton was also
facltated by valuaton standards that dd not mark non-performng loans to market,
unlke much of the losses from securtsed products n the recent crses. In addton,
the refusal of banks to foreclose on borrowers mght have reﬂected a dﬀerent
resoluton culture and code of cvlty n Japan; namely, one that eschews the large
turnover of jobs and the frequent dschargng of workers and avods nducng a
humlatng ‘loss of face’ for delnquent borrowers58.
For the real economy, the ever-greenng of loans mpled a weakenng of growth
prospects59. Potentally more eﬃcent enterprses were dened ﬁnancng, thereby
hamperng the natural entry and ext of ﬁrms nto and out of themarket place. Indeed,
wth the recesson n Japan at the begnnng of the 1990s, entry rates of ﬁrms declned
from ther pre-crss peak of above7percent to a range of 4-5 percent, whereas ﬁrmext
rates remaned subdued at ther pre-crss levels throughout the 1990s60.
The lesson from ths experence s to recognse non-performng loans n a tmely
manner and have strong nsttutons n place to deal wth the restructurng. Ths
reduces uncertanty and avods adjustment delays. For the euro area, t s a call to
move forward n completng the bankng unon.
Supervision and resolution
Upuntl now, supervsory and resoluton authortes have operated at the natonal level.
Durng the crss, ths set-up has exhbted shortcomngs on three fronts. Frst,
dﬀerences n supervsonmantan humps and hollows n the euro-area playng ﬁeld,
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59. See, for nstance, Caballero, R., T. Hosh and A. Kashyap (2008) ‘Zombe lendng and depressed restructurng n
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and have ncreased to above 4.0 percent snce then.
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thereby dstortng competton; second, dﬀerences n mplct state guarantees aﬀect
banks’ fundng condtons; and thrd, dﬀerences n resoluton frameworks – or a lack
thereof – dstort nvestor condtons across jursdctons.
The envsaged European bankng unon s meant to address these three problems.
Frst, the sngle supervsory mechansm (SSM) wll level the playng ﬁeld n super-
vson. The ECB wll take over supervson of euro-area banks n the second half of
2014.
We wll ensure that euro-area banks are supervsed n a consstent and strngent
manner. Ths mples mpartal supervsory decsons across all member states. We
are already n the mdst of preparatons that wll form the bass for a stress test to be
carred out by the European Bankng Authorty n close collaboraton wth the ECB. In
order to acheve ts goal, ths revew needs to be rgorous and strngent. For t to be
credble, we need commtment on sound backstops as a fall-back opton for fulﬁllng
captal needs.
In Japan, such a close nspecton of bank balance sheets was carred out n 2002. It
proved to be an mportant step to recognsng losses and cleanng balance sheets to
eventually set oﬀ a gradual recovery wth credt expanson n Japan.
Second, one of the objectves of a European bankng unon s to delnk banks from ther
soveregns. That also mples that bank fundng costs wll depend on the qualty of
banks’ assets, and not on the locaton of ther headquarters. Achevng thswouldmark
a mlestone n that t would establsh a sngle captal market throughout Europe that
companes can tap nto. A sngle captal market, n turn, provdes better ﬁnancng for
companes and eases productve nvestment, whch wll revtalse the European
economes. Ultmately, t wll be decsve n ensurng that Europe avods a repeat of
Japan’s ‘lost decade’, durng whch zombe banks poorly allocated ﬁnancng to ﬁrms.
Thrd, orderly deleveragng n the euro area also requres that the restructurng and
resoluton of ndvdual bankswll not endanger ﬁnancal stablty or put publc ﬁnances
at rsk. For ths, the nsttutonal framework needs to be sold. Ths s the ratonale
behnd the creaton of a sngle system wth a sngle resoluton authorty and sngle
resoluton fund, n lne wth the proposal by the European Commsson for a sngle
resoluton mechansm. The resoluton fund s to be entrely ﬁnanced ex ante by the
ﬁnancal ndustry tself n order to protect the European taxpayer. Stll, untl the fund
s fully bult up or for exceptonal crcumstances, t should be able to obtan external
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funds va a backstop. Here, the feasblty of a credt lne from the European Stablty
Mechansm could be explored. Any such backstop should be temporary n nature and
compensated by ex-post leves on the bankng sector, ensurng that the fund s ﬁscally
neutral over the medum term.
A bankng unon wth these elements n place has the potental to delnk banks and
soveregns, not least by followng an mportant prncple: bal-n precedes bal-out. Ths
wll ensure that shareholders and unsecured credtors accordng to the herarchy of
ther clams are the ﬁrst to bear losses, not the taxpayers.
monetary policy
Speakng nmycapacty as a central banker, letmeﬁnally come to the role ofmonetary
polcy n the deleveragng process.
To counter the rsks fromdsorderly deleveragng, the swft cuts n ECB polcy rates and
our non-standard measures were key. Fxed-rate full allotment and longer-term
reﬁnancng operatons stablsed ﬁnancalmarkets early on and counteracted the rsks
from ﬁre sales by provdng lqudty where t was most needed.
Equally, the ECBdd not shy away fromboldmeasures to curtal tal rsks and to restore
themonetary polcy transmsson. Durng 2013 euro-area ﬁnancal fragmentaton has
reduced sgnﬁcantly, captal ﬂows reverted to stressed countres and ﬁnancng costs
for corporates converged somewhat n dﬀerent countres.
These measures had the overarchng purpose of ensurng prce stablty over the
medum term. For the euro area, ths s not merely lp servce to the prmary objectve
stated n the EU Treaty. It s, nstead, the yardstck aganst whch to measure the
success of the ECB polces and to buld credblty. In fact, nﬂaton expectatons
remaned ﬁrmly anchored throughout the crss. By contrast, polcy nterest rates n
Japan n the early 1990s remaned at hgher levels for longer, whch, together wth a
lack of reforms n other areas, contrbuted to protracted economcweakness and fallng
prces. Eventually, nﬂaton expectatons becameunanchored andmade stablsaton
more dﬃcult for monetary polcy once t was at the zero lower bound.
Some commentators would go further and argue that central banks should loosen the
belt n the deleveragng process to actvely stoke hgh nﬂaton61. I dsagree wth ths
lne of reasonng. Although surprse nﬂaton would reduce the real debt burden n the
short run, t would sowdoubts about the central banks’ ablty andwllngness to control
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nﬂaton n the longer run. Ultmately, t would undermne eﬀorts to mplement
structural changes and prudent polces.
However, as the Japanese experence has shown,monetary polcy alone cannot place
the economy on a sustanable growth track. Bold monetary polcy measures may be
eﬀectve n the short run, but they also bear the rsk of reducng ncentves for banks
to restructure balance sheets. We are aware of these rsks.
Furthermore, even f central banks operate wthn ther own specﬁc crcumstances
and mandates, the polcy measures may lead to unntended spllovers to other
countres. To ensure that monetary polcy s transmtted adequately to the economy
and domestc ﬁnancng condtons are nsulated from those prevalng n the global
economy, soundmacroeconomc polces and strong domestc nsttutons are vtal.
In addton, to place the economyback on track to sustanable growth, amedum-term
ﬁscal consoldaton strategy as well as structural reformswth productve nvestment
are essental; these two elements combned wth monetary polcy form the three
arrows dentﬁed by prme mnster Shnzo Abe. Monetary polcy can buy tme to
mplement structural changes and ease the deleveragng process, but t cannot cure
the root causes of mbalances or be a substtute for structural reforms.
Conclusion
Both the euro-area and Japanese economes face major challenges to counter the
rsks fromdeleveragng. Preventng dsorderly deleveragngwll reman key to lmtng
possble adverse eﬀects on the economc performance n themost ndebted euro-area
countres. At the same tme, reparng banks’ balance sheets and ensurng ther
soundness s a pre-condton for re-establshng adequate ﬁnancng of the economy.
Ths s why the SSM, ncludng the comprehensve assessment, and the sngle
resolutonmechansm, are crucal steps towards mprovng euro-area governance. The
European nsttutonal contextmay sometmes appear cumbersome, but the progress
made shows that Europe recognses problems and responds to them.
Nevertheless, even wth these changes, solvng a stock problemmeans addressng a
prolonged adjustment n ﬂows n the future. We are all well aware that debt
consoldaton alone weghs on economc actvty just lke a det leaves one wth the
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feelng of fatgue. The deleveragng process wll requre tme; we should not lose
patence n the process.
Compared wth past epsodes, deleveragng has, n fact, become even more
challengng. The global dmenson of deleveragng makes burden-shftng across
countres mpossble and today’s demographc trends are placng a stran on our
growth prospects. It s therefore crucal to balance the consoldaton across
generatons62.
Nonetheless, the need to complement the consoldaton process wth structural
changes n order tomake our economes ﬁtter should be reemphassed. Ths nvolves
reducng red tape to ease busness creaton, streamlnng governance of state-owned
enterprses and reallocatng workers more ﬂexbly from stagnatng and declnng
ndustres to productve and expandng ones. Structural reforms are not only requred
n the countres n the euro area, but have also been recognsed by prmemnster Abe
n hs thrd arrow as essental to securng the Japanese recovery over the long term.
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Japan and the European Union in the global economy
Japan and the European Union are open economies with significant trade and
financial links. Both are affected by the rise of emerging markets, which repre-
sent a huge opportunity but also imply the need to continuously adapt the pro-
duction structure to the new competition. Both economies also face compara-
ble internal economic adjustments. Japan, where it took years to resolve the
problems that arose in the banking sector in the 1990s, is pursuing the so-
called ‘Abenomics’ strategy to overcome deflation, re-invigorate economic
growth and increase productivity growth rates. Europe, meanwhile, continues
to struggle with the effects of severe crisis, with similar balance-sheet adjust-
ments happening in some parts of its economy. In Europe as in Japan, the role
of monetary policy and banking policy is hotly debated, and the appropriate
role of fiscal policy and structural reform is controversial in both economies.
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